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Preface
SAP
Founded in 1972, SAP is the leading provider of collaborative business solutions.
Headquartered in Walldorf, Germany, SAP is the world’s third-largest indepen-
dent software supplier. They employ over 43,000 people in more than 50 countries.
Their professionals are dedicated to provide high-level customer support and ser-
vices. Through SAP Research, they introduce new ideas for future solutions.
In contrast to SAP’s product groups, which work on new functions and releases,
SAP researchers explore opportunities that haven’t been developed into products
yet. They track technology trends, evaluate the potential impact on SAP solutions
and customers, and generate breakthrough technologies.
Located in Walldorf, Germany, SAP Research has additional facilities in Palo Alto,
CA, United States; Karlsruhe, Germany; Brisbane, Australia; Sophia Antipolis,
France; and Johannesburg, South Africa.
The WASP Project
The WASP project [90] is a research project funded by the European Union and
includes 19 partners. The consortium consists of six industrial partners, one Small-
to-Medium Enterprise (SME), six large research institutes and six universities (in-
cluding EPFL). All of them have a proven experience with WSNs.
The Mission Statement of WASP is
“The WASP (Wirelessly Accessible Sensor Populations) project provides theory,
methods, hardware and software to construct highly optimized applications on a net-
work of generic and flexible nodes.” [90]
Academia is actively researching on Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN). However,
the Industry is reluctant to use the results coming from academic research. This is
due to the mismatch between the research at the Application Level and the Node
and Network Level.
The WASP project aims at narrowing this mismatch down by covering the whole
range from basic hardware, sensors, processor, communication, over the packaging
of the nodes, the organization of the nodes, toward the information distribution and
a selection of applications. The emphasis in the project lays in the self-organization
and the services, which link the application to the sensor network.
Research into the nodes themselves is needed because a strong link lies between
the required flexibility and the hardware design.
Research into the applications is necessary because the properties of the required
service will influence the configuration of both sensor network and application for
1
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optimum efficiency and functionality.
Three business areas, elderly care, traffic control and herd control, are selected for
their significance in the society and large range of requirements, to validate the
WASP results.
2
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensors are small devices that are able to gather, process and deliver infor-
mation from a physical environment to an external system. By doing so, they open
new applications in different domains, such as healthcare, traffic control, defense
and agriculture. In healthcare for example, we can imagine remotely monitoring an
elderly patient at his home . His pulse, body temperature, activities and other phys-
iological signs are monitored continuously using a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN).
This WSN is connected to a medical emergency response center in charge of detect-
ing abnormal changes in the patient’s health.
The integration of WSN with Business Applications (BAs) (as for healthcare) raises
technical and security related challenges. Existing approaches (e.g. EIC [42], RUNES
[6], CoBIs [1], Agimone [45]) target technical issues such as interoperability between
WSN and BAs or heterogeneity of acquired sensor data. However, to the best of our
knowledge, efficient end-to-end confidentiality of sensor data between sensor nodes
and BAs is not addressed in the literature.
In this work, we focus on the security and trust challenges raised by the integration
of WSNs into BAs. In healthcare for example, we will see that the patient’s medical
data is confidential and highly sensitive. This means that there is a need for end-to-
end confidentiality of sensor data from sensors to the applications. The fulfilment
of this requirement is difficult due to the limited resources in WSNs. Therefore, we
will introduce an efficient security scheme [83] that does not use complex operations
and guarantees end-to-end confidentiality of sensor data.
In chapter 2, we provide an insight of WSN and their integration with business
applications. We emphasize on the fact that business applications have a strong
interest in the integration with WSNs. We propose in chapter 3 to analyze the
risks of such integration. We show that loss of privacy of sensor data is critical for
business applications. Chapter 4 is dedicated to the security analysis of an existing
security scheme [83] for end-to-end confidentiality of sensor data from the nodes to
the business applications. In addition to a detailed security analysis of this security
scheme, in chapter 5, we study the randomness of the key generation proposed in
3
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[83]. Last but not least, in order to check the feasibility of this approach, we imple-
ment a proof-of-concept based both on a simulated and real WSN. Details of this
implementation can be found in chapter 6. We conclude this master thesis with a
summary of our contribution and future work in chapter 7.
4
CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
”The most profound technologies
are those that disappear. They weave
themselves into the fabric of everyday life
until they are indistinguishable from it.”
Mark Weiser
2.1 Wireless Sensor Networks
The research community has shown a considerable interest in Wireless Sensor Net-
works (WSNs) in the past years. Some even claim that WSNs are one of the emerging
technologies that will change the world [10].
WSNs are made of small devices called Sensor Nodes (motes) that monitor their
local environment. These low-cost, self-powered motes have just enough transmis-
sion power to pass sensed data to nearby sensors which in turn forward it to other
sensors. This leads to a new type of distributed system that is self-organizing and
opens many applications, ranging from traffic over healthcare to military.
2.1.1 WSN Components
Figure 2.1 shows how Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) can be connected to exist-
ing infrastructures, such as the Internet. We identify three major components: (i)
Sensor Nodes, (ii) Sinks and (iii) Gateways.
Nodes are organized in Sensor Fields and connected to a Gateway via a Sink node.
Sinks are sensor nodes which are more powerful than normal motes and can be
seen as the “spokesman” of the underlying sensor field. Every sensed data packet
travels through the sink and is relayed to the gateway. The gateway is in charge of
delivering data to higher level services, such as a WSN Middlewares (See Section 2.2).
5
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Figure 2.1: Wireless Sensor Network Architecture
Sensor Node
A Sensor Node has very basic interfaces and components. Each is equipped with
a limited processor, little memory and sensors that monitor for example tempera-
ture, light and motion. It is also equipped with a wireless transceiver that has a
short transmission range of typically around 20-50 meters. The sensor size is mostly
determined by its power supply which usually is 2xAA batteries.
As an example we show a Crossbow MICAz Sensor Board1 in Figure 2.2. This
sensor node has 128 KiB of memory, its power comes from 2xAA batteries, it con-
sumes 19.7 [mA] in reception and 14 [mA] in transmission. We see that sensor nodes
have little energy and computational power at their disposal. The main requirement
for working with sensor nodes therefore becomes optimizing its energy consumption.
A wireless sensor node can be an Information Source, a Forwarding (routing)
Node or a Sink.
When the node acts as an Information Source, it only generates data and trans-
mits it to its neighbours (e.g. temperature, pressure). To save energy, the node will
be inactive most of the time, and only “wake-up” periodically.
1See http://www.xbow.com
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Figure 2.2: Crossbow MICAz Sensor Board
A Forwarding Node is one that can perform some intermediate data processing
(e.g. data aggregation or taking average/max/min) and relays data from other sen-
sor nodes. A sensor node can act as both an Information Source and a Forwarding
Node.
A Sink receives all the data generated in the WSN and forwards them to the gate-
way. Since all the traffic goes through the sink, it needs more power and ressources
than a normal sensor node.
Gateway
The gateway is the bridge between the WSN and other entities such as a WSN
middleware. It can either store data locally or forward it.
2.1.2 WSN Characteristics
Sensor nodes are usually scattered in sensor fields as shown in Figure 2.1. The
number of sensor nodes deployed can be in the order of hundreds of thousands in
each field. WSNs have a number of operational characteristics, the most important
of which are listed below:
Single-Hop Communication. One of the operational characteristics of WSN is
direct communication. In this communication mode, all sensors have a direct
connection to the sink node. There is no forwarding of data through forwarding
nodes. This approach however is too power consuming and not scalable, as all
nodes need to be in range with the sink node. Therefore it makes more sense
to rely on multi-hop communications.
Multi-Hop Communication. In this communication mode, forwarding nodes are
used to enable communication over long distances for devices that are not in
range with a sink node. The idea is to make the network more energy efficient,
as the devices require less power to communicate hop by hop then if they were
7
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to communicate with the sink directly. In most case scenarios, the sensor nodes
would not be able to communicate with the sink directly anyway, since their
range is very limited (few meters).
Energy Efficient Mode of Operation. A key feature to support long lasting sen-
sor networks is to use the available limited energy in the most optimal way.
Sensor nodes can greatly increase their energy consumptions by sleeping most
of the time and only periodically waking up to receive and transmit data.
Automatic Load Balancing. Nodes should be autonomous enough to “smartly”
select the parent node to which they send their data packets to. The selection
process is based on the link quality, the parent’s load and the hop count to the
sink.
Self-Configuration. Sensor nodes should automatically adapt to changing network
characteristics while optimizing energy usage. This auto-configuration has to
deal with node failures, node additions to the network and obstacles.
2.2 Middlewares
One obstacle in the integration of WSN into business applications is the gap between
software applications and low-level constructs such as WSNs. To fill this gap, mid-
dleware systems are used. They can be considered as a software infrastructure
that is the glue between the sensor network and the client applications.
There are many existing middleware architectures, but most of them focus on the
requirements of the WSN itself and do not address the integration of WSNs with
business applications. In the next section we will describe some of the middlewares
we identified.
2.2.1 Existing Middlewares
CoBIs
In CoBIs [1], the authors propose that applications access the services offered by
the WSN via Web Services (Information about Web Services can be found in [14]).
In other words, the WSN is hidden to the application layer. The major task of
the middleware is the mediation of service requests between the application layer
and the WSN layer. However, the major drawback is that the sensor nodes need to
be modified in order to work with this architecture. We believe that a middleware
should not be aware of the Application Layer and as such CoBIs is not transparent
enough.
RUNES
The RUNES [6] project uses a component-based middleware. Components are units
of functionality and deployment that interact through interfaces. RUNES offers
plug-in interaction paradigms described as generic APIs that can be implemented in
accordance with the application needs. RUNES looked promising initially but there
8
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was no fully-functional implementation available.
MiLAN
The MiLAN [48] middleware focuses on sensor network management to enable proac-
tive WSN applications. They introduce the notion of generic connectors that permit
to gather data from any types of nodes. However, the issue of standardizing sensor
data into a single format is left unanswered.
Agimone
Agimone [45] is a middleware that integrates Sensor and IP networks. Its main fo-
cus lies on the distribution and coordination of WSN applications (Mobile Agents)
across different WSNs. Even though their motivation is based on a cargo tracking
application, the actual integration of Agimone into real applications is out of scope.
Hourglass
Hourglass [78] is an Internet-based infrastructure for connecting a wide range of
sensors, services, and applications in a robust fashion. In Hourglass, streams of data
elements are routed from sensors to client applications. WSNs are connected to the
Hourglass infrastructure through proxy services. These Services are not platform
independant and as such does not offer independance of the WSN, the middleware
and the applications.
IrisNet
The IrisNet [39], contrary to traditional WSNs, proposes a sensor network made of
desktop PCs equipped with low-cost sensors such as webcams and inter-connected
over the Internet. Their architecture offers a query service to obtain sensor data
from anywhere on the Internet. Unfortunately, IrisNet is not taking into account
the resource restrictions of embedded sensors and therefore a migration to tradi-
tional WSNs is not possible.
EIC
The EIC (Enterprise Integration Component) [42] combines a top-down approach of
context-aware and bottom-up approach of WSN middleware. The EIC is designed
on a Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) [14] and addresses the heterogeneity of
WSNs. It also offers a standardized way to access sensor data.
The EIC is designed by taking into account business application requirements and
as such addresses the problem of delivering data to enterprise systems that has been
left open until now. We feel that this middleware offers a modular and flexible archi-
tecture that effectively links the WSN and the Business Application world together.
Furthermore, in the context of the WASP project (introduced in the Preface), the
EIC has been retained as middleware and an implementation is also available. For
those reasons, we use the EIC as middleware in the scope of this project .
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Figure 2.3: Body Sensor Network (BSN)
2.3 Healthcare Scenario
In WASP, three business areas are retained to validate the results of the project:
(i) Elderly Care, (ii) Herd Control and (iii) Traffic Control. In the scope of this
thesis, we will discuss the healthcare scenario because the use of WSNs offers many
promising applications that could lead to better healthcare systems. We first give an
overview of Body Sensor Networks and Ambient Sensor Networks, which are special
types of WSNs followed by a description of the Patient Monitoring scenario.
2.3.1 Body Sensor Networks
Body Sensor Networks (BSNs) can be seen as WSNs with the difference that the
sensors are body worn or are implantable. The main objectives in BSNs are extreme
low power consumption, ease of use and unobtrusiveness for the patient. Figure 2.32
shows a patient equipped with sensors to capture different physiological data such
as the blood pressure, galvanic skin response (GSR) and temperature.
The sensors in a BSN can be integrated into fabrics as in Figure 2.53 or worn as
objects such as finger rings (see Figure 2.44). With the recent advancements in
miniaturization, Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs) became highly interesting for
the WSN community. These devices monitor and treat physiological conditions in-
side of the body. Example types of such devices are pacemakers, implantable cardiac
defillibrators and drug delivery systems. These devices can now be equipped with
wireless capabilities and researchers believe that emerging IMDs will communicate
with each other [46].
Below we give a list of common body sensors and their usage for body monitoring.
2Adapted from http://dicom.i2r.a-star.edu.sg/ehealth/?q=wban
3Taken from [93]
4Taken from http://darbeloﬄab.mit.edu/node/28
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Figure 2.4: Ring Sensor to monitor blood oxygen saturation.
Figure 2.5: Sensor nodes embedded in clothes.
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ECG or HRV (Heart Rate Variability) The readings from an Electrocardio-
gram (ECG) machine are used to monitor ischemia, arrhythmias or palpita-
tions. Significant increase or decrease in HRV can also be used to indicate
heart dysfunction or signs of other complications. They can be combined with
implantable cardiac defibrillators to offer therapy with very short latencies as
the monitoring sensor can collaborate with the defibrillator through wireless
communication [46].
Motion Sensors Three dimensional accelerometers provides data on motion and
activity levels of the patient.
Respiratory Rate This shows the global respiratory function of the patient. Short-
ness of breath can be used as an indicator of a chronic disease, e.g. COPD,
asthma or progressive lung dysfunction.
Blood Pressure Measuring the blood pressure is useful for people with hyper/hypo-
tension or CHD. It may also be used on post operative patients that are in a
critical condition and could experience blood-loss or hemorrhages.
Near-Body Temperature The increase or decrease of body temperature helps
identifying diseases (e.g. a fever caused by an infection). Furthermore, the
temperature is correlated to the activity levels of a human and such readings
help to infer the activities of the patient.
Implantable Blood Glucose Sensor These sensors are important for monitoring
diabetic or at risk hyperglycemia patients and can be combined with therapeu-
tic insulin delivery systems to treat diabetes or other glucose related diseases
[46].
SpO2 Sensor. An SpO2 sensor measures the level of oxygen in the blood. It is
used to monitor pulmonary oedema or hypoxia. Also, oxygen saturation can
provide additional information to infer activity levels. The pulse can also be
measured with an SpO2 sensor.
GSR (Galvanic Skin Response). GSR provides an indication of stress factors
(it is used in lie detectors) which is useful when monitoring activity or signs of
emotional wellbeing or degradation.
Figure 2.6 holds a summary table of the different signals we described above. In
particular we see that most of the Body Sensors are wearable which is mostly due
to their size and also user acceptance of putting electronics inside their body. Tech-
nologies such as MEMS (MicroElectroMechanical Systems) will offer extremely small
sensors in the future (e.g. 0.001 to 0.1 [mm]) and we will surely see a shift from
wearable to implantable sensors.
2.3.2 Ambient Sensor Network
Ambient Sensor Networks (ASNs) refer to WSNs installed in a patient’s home un-
obtrusively. These sensor networks can be used to monitor a person’s social health.
They identify the individual’s physical location and provide readings on the levels
of activity they undertake. Correlating the patient’s environmental data with the
12
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Figure 2.6: Overview of Body Sensors
physiological measurements from a BSN can provide much better appreciation of
the context in which the sensing occurs.
To familiarize the reader with ASNs, we provide a non-exhaustive list of the sensors
used in “smart-homes”. A summary table with the most important characteristics
is given in Figure 2.7.
Blob Motion A Blob motion sensor extracts information from abstract video im-
ages to generate data on the patient’s activity such as his current location,
what he is doing and his current posture. To ensure the patient’s privacy, the
visual images are discarded after processing and only the output of the analysis
is kept.
Ambient Temperature Ambient temperature sensors record the room tempera-
ture which can be used to prevent health deteriorations for “at risk” patients
that should not be exposed to extreme heat or cold.
PIR (Passive InfraRed) Low cost and low power PIR sensors determine patient
activity and room occupancy, which can be correlated with the time of the day
to analyze behavioral patterns.
Bed Pressure Readings from bed pressure sensors indicate sleeping patterns and
the patient’s sleep duration. This information can be used to detect depression,
neglect or to monitor psychological diseases.
Electromagnetic Electromagnetic sensors are used to detect door usage. Partic-
ularly, these indicators can be helpful to determine the patient’s activity in-
and outside of their home.
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Figure 2.7: Overview of Ambient Sensors
Sensitive Rugs Embedded into the fabric or hidden under rugs, these sensors help
locating the patient more precisely.
Pressure Mats Pressure mats are used for example in fall prevention and are usu-
ally connected to an alarm system that is triggered as soon as pressure is
exercised or released.
Healthcare professionals can make valuable use of the ambient sensor data as it
provides them with a better understanding of the context in which the vital-sign
readings (from the BSN) have occurred. The caring professionals can monitor a
disease’s progression more accurately by correlating data from ASNs and BSNs.
This is motivated by the fact that the patient’s activity is strongly related to his
health state.
2.3.3 Remote Patient Monitoring
The reality of constantly monitoring patients, especially those at their homes, opens
many possibilities that were not imaginable until now. For instance, cardiac ar-
rhythmias occur for 4% of the population over the age of 60 and reaches 9% for the
octogenarians [40]. With the help of Body Sensor Networks, heart rate abnormali-
ties can be detected earlier than ever.
Furthermore, BSNs can help monitoring disease progression and patient response to
any treatment initiated. Before BSNs, these tasks were accomplished using “snap-
shots” of the patient’s health status during medical visits. With the help of BSNs
however, a platform for continuous monitoring is developed and represent the latest
evolution of diagnostic tools [93].
There are a multitude of applications in the healthcare domain that could make
valuable use of BSNs, such as monitoring patients with chronic disease, hospital pa-
tients and elderly patients. Further information about these scenarios can be found
14
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Figure 2.8: Remote Patient Monitoring
in [93]. In the scope of this thesis, we will focus on elderly patient monitoring at
home.
Non-intrusive monitoring of “at risk” people such as elderly, may prove invaluable
given that life expectancy keeps rising and that the demand for healthcare resources
is constantly increasing [19]. A key example of the usefulness of remote elderly mon-
itoring is during the months of extreme weather conditions. When it is either very
hot or very cold, elderly patients are at increased risk of hospital admission. This is
due to the fact they are not able to seek medical help early enough. An example of
this is an elderly person, living alone and acquiring a chest infection, which he fails
to identify until the infection requires hospital admission [93].
Also, people may behave differently before getting ill. Behavioral changes might
include a decrease of appetite, reduced movement activity and tendency to stay
inside of the home. For this reason, correlating ASNs with BSNs allows an early
detection of any deterioration in the patient’s health condition and may reduce the
number of hospital admissions.
In Figure 2.8 we show an example architecture of a WSN enhanced healthcare sys-
tem. We identify entities that we discussed previously such as WSNs in forms of
ASNs, BSNs, the Enterprise Integration Component acting as a mediation layer be-
tween the WSNs and software applications.
To assess the patient’s health condition, sensors constantly collect data and relay
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it to a WSN HUB (e.g. a Gateway). The gateway forwards the data to the EIC
middleware for storage or further processing. It can also be queried directly for
displaying real-time data on mobile devices such as PDA’s.
Example Scenario
With the multitude of application scenarios that arise from the remote monitor-
ing scenario outlined above, we present one scenario that makes use of the system
architecture depicted in Figure 2.8.
Jon is in his sixties and was diagnosed as an “at risk” patient for cardiac arrhyth-
mias. He lives alone in his home with an installed ASN and is equipped with a BSN
that constantly collects his physiological data.
Jon forgot to take his medicine the previous days and so when he walks up the
stairs too quickly and feels a sudden pain in his chest, he feels a shortness of breath
and his HRV changes. These being typical indicators of an imminent heart attack,
the EIC immediately generates an alert and notifies the caring physician of the emer-
gency. On the way to Jon’s home, the doctor looks at the medical history to see
that Jon forgot to take his medecine and that the physical activity of walking up the
stairs had caused these irregularities. Once on site, the doctor can connect directly
to the WSN HUB and see all of Jon’s vital signs in real-time and determine whether
a hospital admission is necessary or not. In this case, Jon just has to rest and take
his medecine.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we gave an overview of WSNs with the description of their compo-
nents. We realized that a mediation layer is required to fill the gap between WSNs
and business applications. As such, we selected the EIC amongst the existing ones
as the most promising mediation layer between WSNs and business applications.
We then analyzed the impact of BSNs and ASNs in healthcare systems. The el-
derly remote patient monitoring scenario shows the benefits of the integration of
WSNs into business applications. Unfortunately, the prospect of ubiquitous patient
monitoring also raises security concerns. Many risks might emerge from integrating
new technologies such as BSNs and ASNs into business applications. While not all
risks are necessarily harmful or dangerous, some might be and as such cannot be
ignored.
In the next chapter, we will identify vulnerabilities and their associated risks in
the system described in Section 3.1 following NIST risk assessment methodology
[65]. Based on the dangerosity of each risk, we suggest countermeasures for the risk
mitigation of the most potentially harmful risks.
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CHAPTER 3
RISK ASSESSMENT
”However well organized the
foundations of life may be,
life must always be full of risks.”
Edgar W. Howe
Risk Assessment aims at answering the following question: “What can go wrong
in my system?”. Therefore, it addresses consequences of damage caused to systems,
their probability, and countermeasures. Risk Assessment is part of Risk Manage-
ment, which can be seen as a process of identifying and assessing risk and reducing
it to an acceptable level for the organization. Furthermore, in Risk Management
it is desirable to implement the suggested solution measures in order to maintain
that desired level. The levels of acceptance however are not constant and they are
subject to revision based on the organization’s mission goals.
Risk is a function of the likelihood that a certain vulnerability is exploited and the
resulting impact on the organization [65]. A vulnerability is a flaw or a weakness
in a system that, if exercised (accidentally or intentionally exploited) results in a
security breach. At last, Impact is the magnitude of harm that could be caused
by exploiting a vulnerability. It relies on the organization’s mission goals, and is
mapped to the damage (e.g. monetary, reputation, data loss).
Risk Assessment methodologies are aimed at identifying potential threats and vul-
nerabilities in a system as well as the probability of their occurrences. In addition,
the output of this process support organizations with a better Risk Management by
identifying controls for minimizing risks.
We identify many methodologies for Risk Assessment in the literature (e.g. [65]
[13] [2] [53] [36]). However, some of them are tailored for specific domains. For
example, the Sandia methodologies (e.g. RAM-W, RAM-P, RAM-CF) [53] cover
public domains such as water facilities, prisons, and chemical facilities. But those
methodologies are not general enough to be easily transferred to other domains (e.g.
finance, healthcare).
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From the literature, we identify two general risk assessment methodologies, the
NIST 800-30 1 guidelines (published in [65]) and the OCTAVE 2 method [13]. These
methodologies provide general risk assessment guidelines that can be tailored to any
organization or domain. In [27], the authors perform a comparative analysis of the
NIST and OCTAVE methods. Their conclusion is that both methodologies are fun-
damentally similar but differ on some points.
The first difference between NIST and OCTAVE is that NIST devotes one step
for determining the probability that a threat source (e.g. an attacker) exploits a
potential vulnerability. The notion of probability is not present in the OCTAVE
method. The designers of the OCTAVE method believe that unforeseeable changes
in the system make the prediction of probabilities too imprecise to be useful [27].
The second differentiator is that NIST includes qualitative and quantitative risk
assessment guidance in their publication. The former refers to using qualitative
categories (e.g. High, Medium and Low) while the latter provides quantitative val-
ues (e.g. $ 100 or $ 100’000) for determining the magnitude of impact. OCTAVE
does not provide means to evaluate risk based on the likelihood that a potential
vulnerability is exploited. Probabilities are inherent to quantitative risk assessment
and therefore the OCTAVE method does not provide any guidance for conducting
quantitative risk assessments.
The NIST SP 800-30 [65] has become the reference for a valid Risk Assessment
methodology and is commonly referred to as the standard that governments (amongst
others) use [66]. Also, based on the generality and the widely spread use of the NIST
800-30 guidelines, we will base our risk assessment on those recommendations. Fur-
thermore, we note that the NIST SP 800-30 is freely available and does not require
any licensing. Other methodologies such as Cramm [2] have to be purchased and
cost as much as $ 5’788 per paper copy plus an annual license fee of $ 1’700 [3]. This
additional factor validates our choice of picking the NIST 800-30 methodology.
Figure 3.1 shows the seven steps that will be used to perform our Risk Assessment.
• System Characterization: Identification of the system’s assets. Assets can be
hardware, software, data and staff. Defining the system will set the boundaries
and the scope of the Risk Assessment. This is Step 1.
• Threats Identification: This is Step 2.
• Vulnerabilities Identification: This is Step 3.
• Likelihood Determination : Assigns probabilities on potential vulnerabilities
being exploited (e.g. how often will this vulnerability be exploited?). This is
Step 4.
1National Institute of Standards and Technology (see http://csrc.nist.gov/)
2OCTAVE - Operationally Critical Threat, Asset and Vulnerability Evaluation (see http://www.
cert.org/octave/)
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• Impact Analysis: In Step 5, we determine the impact magnitude (High, Medium
or Low) resulting from a successful exercise of a vulnerability. This means we
will try to identify if an exploited vulnerability has a great or low impact on
the organization’s goals.
• Risk Determination: In Step 6, we assess the level of risk of the system. The
determination of risk is a function of the likelihood that a vulnerability is
exploited and the resulting impact magnitude.
• Control Recommendation: At last, in Step 7, we propose countermeasures for
the highest risks based on the analysis we completed at that point.
Figure 3.1: Risk Assessment Methodology
3.1 Step 1: System Characterization
The first step is the identification of the boundaries of the system with its char-
acteristics. They are classified into the five following categories: (i) Hardware, (ii)
Software, (iii) System Interfaces (e.g. Ethernet, Wifi), (iv) Data and (v) People (as
depicted in Figure 3.3).
The main components of the complete healthcare monitoring system (the scenario is
detailed in Chapter 2.3) are a Wireless Sensor Network (made out of a Body Sensor
Network and Ambient Sensor Network), a Gateway (to bridge the sensor world with
the rest), the Internet (as main communication medium), a Database (for storing
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Figure 3.2: System
medical data) and Users (either humans or applications). To see how the different
components are linked together, the reader can refer to Figure 3.2. A complete
overview of the system characteristics is depicted in Figure 3.3. We provide a more
thorough system analysis in the sections below.
Hardware
Sensors
A patient has a Wireless Sensor Network at his home. The WSN consists of a Body
Sensor Network (BSN) and an Ambient Sensor Network (ASN). The BSN measures
the biological data of the patient (e.g. heart rate, blood pressure, temperature) and
the ASN records information about the patient’s surroundings (e.g. presence in the
room, room temperature). The sensors use the wireless medium to broadcast the
sensed information. In Chapter 2.3, we provide a more extensive list of such sensors
and their respective usage.
Gateway
Sensed information from the BSN and ASN is transmitted to a gateway. It is in
charge of bridging the WSN with the Internet Cloud.
Middleware Platform
The Middleware platform runs the WSN Middleware. As defined in Section 2.2,
a middleware is a piece of software. It enhances the WSN with capabilities such as
further data processing (e.g. reasoning), sensor data mapping or data storage. The
database can be part of the middleware or can be external to it. The data relayed
from the Gateway is transmitted to the middleware that stores it in a database for
future access.
Input Devices
The input devices that can access the recorded data can be PDAs, computers, lap-
tops or any other device capable of communicating with the middleware platform.
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Software
The Middleware
As seen previously, the WSN Middleware is software that bridges the WSN with
the application world. In Chapter 2.2, we introduced several middleware platforms
such as the Enterprise Integration Component (EIC) [42] that is used in the WASP
project. The database is an integral part of this middleware.
Applications
Users (e.g. nurses, doctors) control software applications that enable them to ac-
cess the collected data from the database. The applications run on devices such as
computers, laptops, PDAs and need to be connected to the Internet.
People
We classify the people involved with this system into three categories: medical
staff, relatives and patients. The medical staffs are made of nurses, doctors and
social aids and they are in charge of patient monitoring. The patients live at home,
equipped with a WSN as described earlier. The relatives (who also can access the
patient’s data under certain legal constraints) can be parents, siblings, children or
legal guardians.
Data
The sensor data being collected by the WSN contains information about the pa-
tient’s health status (e.g. blood pressure, heart rate, temperature) and his surround-
ings (e.g. room temperature, room occupancy) (See Chapter 2.3 for more information
on the different). The sensor data is stored in a database inside of the middleware.
In addition, a different database (not part of the WSN middleware) stores the med-
ical file about the patient. This file usually contains past treatments and diseases of
the patient.
System Interfaces
There are several system interfaces that we consider: from the WSN to the gateway,
from the gateway to the middleware platform and from the middleware to the ap-
plications / users.
WSN to Gateway
Inside the WSN, the sensors use the wireless medium to send and receive informa-
tion. To communicate between each other, the WSN relies on the 802.15.4 protocol
[80]. The gateway is the interface between the WSN network and the Internet. It
communicates on one side through the 802.15.4 protocol and on the other side it
uses the 802.3 Ethernet [79] or the 802.11 WLAN protocol [81] to access the Internet.
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Figure 3.3: System Characterization
Gateway to Middleware Platform
The gateway has two interfaces, one with the WSN and one with the Internet. To
properly communicate with the WSN, the gateway uses the 802.15.4 protocol over
the wireless medium and the 802.3 or the 802.11 protocol to connect to the Internet.
The middleware is connected to the Internet through 802.3 and thus communication
(over TCP/IP) between the middleware and the gateway is possible.
Middleware Platform to Applications
The middleware platform (servers) and the applications are both connected to the
Internet over TCP/IP (either through 802.11 or 802.3).
Summary
We identified many assets that are part of our system, such as Hardware (e.g. Sen-
sors, Middleware Platforms) and Software (e.g. Databases, Business Applications).
In the healthcare system we are considering, the data (see Figure 3.3) is the most
valuable asset. The replacement of hardware equipment is costly. But in comparison
with the loss of patient data, the inherent cost could be more important. Especially
when it comes to compliance with legal requirements (such as the health regula-
tions defined in [32]), the lack of patient privacy can have a negative impact on the
organization.
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3.2 Step 2: Threat Identification
The second step in the Risk Assessment process is to identify the potential threat-
sources that are applicable to the system being evaluated. A threat-source is defined
as “any circumstance or event with the potential to cause harm to an IT system” [65].
Common threat-sources are organized into three main categories [65]:
i Natural Threats (e.g. floods, earthquakes, tornadoes, landslides etc. . . )
ii Human Threats (e.g. any events enabled or caused by humans, unintention-
ally or deliberately, to harm the system)
iii Environmental Threats (e.g. long-term power failure, pollution, etc. . . )
It is recommended to consider all potential threat-sources (originating from all three
categories) while performing the risk assessment, even if they seem unlikely to hap-
pen.
The 2006 Global Security Survey conducted by Deloitte [26] revealed that most se-
curity breaches within organizations come from humans (79% of successful security
breaches are external and 49% are internal originating from human threat-sources).
Therefore, in the scope of this assessment, we focus mainly on human threats rather
than on natural and environmental ones.
Humans can become threat-sources through unintentional (e.g. negligence, human
errors) or deliberate acts (e.g. deliberate attacks by malicious persons). Deliberate
attacks can be malicious attempts to compromise the IT system in question or be-
nign attacks which only try to circumvent system security.
For example, an employee could install some software that contains hidden malware
(a classification of malware and its goal is given in [56]). This malicious software
could then create a new vulnerability in the system. Motivation and resources for
carrying out an attack make humans dangerous threat-sources [65, Section 3.2].
We can classify the threat-sources into Insiders (e.g. doctors, nurses) and Outsiders
(e.g.Cracker, Hacker).
Inside Threat Sources
Inside threat sources are any entities which are part of the system. These range
from patients to medical staff (e.g. nurses, doctors, social aids) to family relatives.
Correlated with motivation, these insiders can turn into potentially dangerous threat
sources. For a malicious insider, the monetary gain from selling private patient infor-
mation to insurance companies can be a strong motivation to perpetrate an attack.
Insurance companies have a high interest in their clients health status or history.
Based on that information, insurance agents can decide if they want to insure the
client.
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Figure 3.4: Threat Statement
While money as a motivation can lead to threat actions such as data theft or eaves-
dropping, other motivational factors such as committing unintentional errors can
lead to threats such as system intrusion, unauthorized system access and input of
falsified data (see Figure 3.4 for more information).
Outside Threat Sources
Outsiders can be hackers, crackers, companies, governments or any maliciously be-
having external entity. Their actions might be motivated by curiosity, ego, monetary
gain or data alteration. Some of the resulting threats are spoofing, impersonation,
replay attacks, system intrusion and others (see Figure 3.4).
In Figure 3.4 we present a list of identified human threat-sources, their possible
motivations and the threat actions. We focus on the technical threats (e.g. system
intrusion) and leave out wetware threats (e.g. social engineering, bribery, dumpster
diving, bribery). The various threat actions can be classified in the following cate-
gories (according to [71]):
Interception. When an unauthorized party gains access to a protected asset. An
example of interception is wiretapping to obtain data on a network.
Interruption. When an asset is lost, unavailable or unusable. An example would
be destruction of hardware components or erasure of programs.
Modification. When an unauthorized party gains access and tampers with an as-
set. Examples of modification are altering values in the database or modifying
data while it is being transmitted.
Fabrication. When an unauthorized party fabricates counterfeit objects in the IT
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Figure 3.5: Threat Classification
system. The intruder might add records in an existing database or insert forged
messages in the network.
In Figure 3.5, we provide a graphical classification of the major human threats we
identified above.
3.3 Step 3: Vulnerability Identification
After having established the threat statement outlined in Figure 3.4, we proceed to
Step 3 of the risk assessment process, namely vulnerability identification. In this
step, we develop a list of system vulnerabilities that can be exploited by the pre-
viously defined threat-sources. A vulnerability, as defined in [65], is “a flaw or a
weakness in system security procedures, design or implementation that could be ex-
ercised and result in a security breach”.
The list of vulnerabilities in any system is endless and a choice has to be made.
Below, we present a small subset of identified vulnerabilities while keeping in mind
that the list is far from being exhaustive. For instance, there are new vulnerabilities
in software components (e.g. Operating Systems, Web Servers . . . ) identified every
day by organizations such as NIST I-CAT3. A security expert should be aware of
those organizations and always take the newest vulnerabilities into account. Seeing
that the list of vulnerabilities for software components only is already growing every
day, it is impossible to provide an exhaustive list for all aspects of the system (e.g.
Hardware, Software, etc . . . ).
Vulnerability #1 (Vul #1)
Sensors broadcast data over the wireless medium within the WSN. The transmis-
sion range of sensors is smaller than for traditional wireless devices because their
3See http://icat.nist.gov
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transmission power is much lower (see Chapter 2.1). Any threat-source, internal or
external, equipped with an antenna can capture all of the data transmitted between
sensors and the base station (provided they are within the transmission range of the
sensors). Those communication packets contain the patient’s private data such as
heart rate or blood pressure. This vulnerability can be exploited for data theft, in-
trusion on privacy or any other threat related to the Interception category in Figure
3.5.
Figure 3.6: Summary: Vulnerability #1
Vulnerability #2 (Vul #2)
Sensor nodes are physically accessible. They are inside of the patient’s home and
are scattered around. This means it is possible for a malicious entity to destroy the
sensors (e.g. for system sabotage), steal them (e.g. for system tampering, denial of
service), or insert new ones (e.g. for spoofing). Once attackers have physical access
to a sensor, they can copy its software components (because sensor nodes are not
tamper resistant), modify them and put them on new sensor nodes. These sensors
can then capture data (e.g. for data theft) or insert forged data (e.g. for system
sabotage, input of falsified data) into the system in a truthful manner.
Figure 3.7: Summary: Vulnerability #2
Vulnerability #3 (Vul #3)
Sensors are restricted devices in terms of battery and computation power. For ex-
ample, an outside attacker can exploit this vulnerability by exhausting the battery
of a sensor (see The Ressurection Duckling [84]). This can be achieved by sending a
sustained series of useless communications that will make the targeted nodes waste
energy on processing. This vulnerability can be exploited through Denial-Of-Service
as the sensors become unresponsive if their batteries have been drained.
Figure 3.8: Summary: Vulnerability #3
Vulnerability #4 (Vul #4)
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Collected data is stored in clear in a database. Attacks such as viruses and Tro-
jan horses enable an attacker to gain access to the database. Furthermore, if the
server hosting the database is physically accessible, the contents of the database
can be easily compromised (e.g. by copying all the data from the hard drive). This
vulnerability can be exploited for data theft, data modification, destruction of data,
fabrication of data and system intrusion.
Figure 3.9: Summary: Vulnerability #4
Vulnerability #5 (Vul #5)
The data is conveyed from nodes to users, through the gateway and the middleware.
And information is stored on database. The data transportation is done without
any protection measures. In addition, any component in the system (e.g. WSN,
Middleware Platform, and Database) is vulnerable to attacks (e.g. eavesdropping,
hijacking). Any component that is taken over by a hostile entity can be modified
to steal, forge, destroy and modify sensed data. Furthermore, the communication
channels across the whole system are not secured. They do not provide neither
confidentiality nor integrity of sensor data.
Figure 3.10: Vulnerability #5
3.4 Step 4: Likelihood Determination
In this step, we evaluate the likelihood that a given vulnerability is exploited by an
attacker. The likelihood that a potential vulnerability is exercised by a given threat-
source is described as High, Medium or Low. Each likelihood level is determined by
the attacker’s motivation, capabilities and the existence and effectiveness of current
controls [65]. Given the small volume of information available to us we do not have
a high visibility of existing controls. For this reason, we do not include this factor
in the likelihood determination process. Figure 3.11 gives a description of the three
likelihood levels.
Any data related to a person (including medical data) is protected by the Euro-
pean Directive 95/46/EC [32]. This law includes protective rules for the processing,
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handling and distribution of data collected automatically (e.g. through sensors). Or-
ganizations have the legal obligation to be compliant with those regulations and as
such we consider the sensor data as the most valuable asset.
Figure 3.11: Likelihood Levels Description Table
Using the table outlined above, we can now give a rating to each of the vulnerabili-
ties identified in Step 3.
Vul #1: The main resource needed to eavesdrop on a wireless channel is an antenna
that is able to capture the waves emitted by the sensors. Commercial antennas are
very cheap (e.g. $ 20) or can be homemade (see [38] for an antenna made out of a
plastic bottle and some metal for less than $ 1). The WiSens ZigBee Packet Sniffer4
contains both hardware and software to capture all communication packets sent be-
tween nodes in a WSN. It is more expensive (the kit costs $ 795) than the previously
mentioned methods but the kit needs no specific knowledge to be used. An attacker
can stand outside of a patient’s house with the sniffing equipment and collect all the
information coming from the sensors. Based on the low cost for the material and
the ease of use for this attack, the likelihood rating we assign for this vulnerability
is High.
Vul #2: In the healthcare scenario, the sensor nodes are inside the patient’s home.
One of the problems is that the attacker needs to be physically close to the nodes
to perform the attack. This difficulty is more or less challenging depending on the
threat-source. An internal threat-source (e.g. Social Aid, Relatives) usually has the
key to the patient’s home and so entering the patient’s home is a trivial task. An
external attacker however has to break into the place first. This task may be difficult
depending on how the home is secured (e.g. with a burglar alarm or without). In
addition, an intruder needs at least a strong technical background to tamper with
sensor nodes. Based on the problem of physical proximity and on those required
capabilities, we assign a rating of Medium for this vulnerability.
Vul #3: To exploit this vulnerability, a threat-source needs a high level of un-
derstanding of wireless devices and also specific hardware equipment. There might
be controls in place to prevent this vulnerability from being exploited, such as sensors
processing signals only originating from trusted sources. Since this attack requires
special capabilities and knowledge, we assign it a rating of Low.
Vul #4: Data is the most critical and sensitive part of the system. The collected
values are stored in a database. Any method that provides access to the database
4See http://www.bzworks.com/wisenssoftware.htm
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may be exploited to steal, modify, insert or destroy data. Some of the methods to
break into a system (and subsequently to the database) include using Trojan horses,
viruses or internal staff being negligent (e.g. by sharing their password or by in-
stalling potentially unsafe programs). Considering that the most important asset is
the data and that there are no special capabilities needed we rate this vulnerability
as High.
Vul #5: The data is sent in clear through the whole system: from the WSN
to the Users through the Gateway and the Middleware. Each component can be
compromised and used to perform the attacks (e.g. data theft, data corruption).
Additionally, the communication channels do not use any mechanisms to offer con-
fidentiality and integrity, so an attacker can eavesdrop the channel between any two
components inside the system (e.g. between the WSN and the Gateway, between
the Gateway and the Middleware or between the Middleware and the Users). Given
that an attacker can be anywhere in the system (e.g. in the WSN or at the Gateway)
and has different methods available to perform his attacks, we assign a likelihood
rating of High to this vulnerability.
3.5 Step 5: Impact Analysis
In the fifth step of the Risk Assessment methodology, we determine the adverse im-
pact resulting from a successful exploitation of a vulnerability. As previously seen,
the resulting damage can be related to monetary, reputation or data loss. The mag-
nitude of damage can be categorized as High, Medium or Low. Using the likelihood
ratings from the previous section and the impact analysis, we determine risk levels
for each of the vulnerabilities we have identified in the step 3. As mentioned, our risk
assessment is data-centric: we focus on sensor data security concerns rather than on
hardware or software. Therefore, we determine impact based on vulnerabilities on
data rather than on hardware or software.
Table 3.12 describes the qualitative categories that we use namely High, Medium
and Low impact.
Figure 3.12: Impact Levels Description Table
Vul #1: Exploiting this vulnerability results in the loss of confidentiality of the
patient’s private data. Disclosure of private medical data can result in loss of public
confidence or lawsuits filed against the organization because a person’s medical data
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is protected by laws such as [32]. The absence of security measures to guarantee data
confidentiality or integrity is an obstacle for the user’s acceptance of such technology.
We therefore assign an impact magnitude of High if this vulnerability is exploited.
Vul #2: Stolen, destroyed or newly inserted sensor nodes results in different prob-
lems such as insertion of false data or unavailability of future sensor data. The
successful exploit leads to a loss of Integrity (if the transmitted data has been mod-
ified after it has been sensed and before it has been sent) and Availability (e.g.
when nodes have been destroyed then no new data is being sent to the servers) and
Confidentiality (e.g. when rogue sensor nodes relay sensor data to the attacker). In
the case of stolen or destroyed sensors, there are also monetary costs inherent to
the replacement of the devices. The adverse impact level for this vulnerability is
therefore rated as High.
Vul #3: Battery exhaustion of a sensor causes loss of availability or transmis-
sion of faulty data. When a sensor runs on low battery its precision is impeded.
We assume that controls are in place to monitor battery exhaustion such as LEDs
showing the battery level or an emitting sound when the battery is low. Based on
the fact that data is lost or corrupted even if the incident is quickly detected, we
assign an impact magnitude of Medium to this vulnerability.
Vul #4: Access to the database means that an intruder can steal, modify, in-
sert and destroy all of the data. Thus, the adverse impact of this security breach
respectively results in loss of Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability. This vulner-
ability has a higher impact than Vul #1 because when an intruder is eavesdropping
on the wireless channel he only has access to current data. However, if the attacker
has access to the complete database, he has access to current and past data of all
patients (both medical information and sensor data). The impact magnitude for this
vulnerability is thus High.
Vul #5: Data travelling through the system without any protection measures re-
sults in a loss of confidentiality and integrity. The data can be stolen by eavesdrop-
ping the communication channels and can be modified by accessing or tampering the
components (e.g. Sensors, Gateway or Middleware). Given the fact that for any ex-
ploit of this vulnerability the most valuable asset is lost, we assign this vulnerability
an impact rating of High.
3.6 Step 6: Risk Determination
In this step of the risk assessment, we assess the level of risk of the system we an-
alyze. Risk is a function of (i) the likelihood of a given threat-source exercising a
vulnerability and (ii) the magnitude of impact in case of a successful exploitation.
The risk levels are determined by multiplying the rating assignments of likelihood
and impact. Figure 3.13 outlines how the risk levels can be computed based on
the inputs from the likelihood (High, Medium, Low) and impact categories (High,
Medium, Low). Multiplying categories with each other leads to subjective interpre-
tations of the outcome. For example, does the multiplication of High with Medium
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yield Medium or High?
To avoid confusions, we assign an arbitrary metric to the categories; probabilities for
the likelihood levels and values for the impact ones (we base our values on the ones
suggested by NIST [65]). The probability assigned for each threat likelihood level is
1.0 for High, 0.5 for Medium and 0.1 for Low. For each impact level, we assign 10
for High, 5 for Medium and 1 for Low. The resulting matrix is outlined in Figure
3.13. The final risk levels are High when the result is bigger than 5, Medium for a
result between 1 and 5 and Low if the outcome lies in the 0.1 to 1 interval.
Figure 3.13: Risk Level Matrix - High (> 5), Medium (> 1 to 5), Low (0.1 to 1)
The description for each risk level is given in Figure 3.14.
Figure 3.14: Risk Description Table
Using the risk level matrix we just defined, we can determine the risk levels for each
vulnerability we have identified. The resulting Risk Matrix is shown in Figure 3.15.
From that matrix, we identify vulnerability #3 as a Low Risk, vulnerability #2
exhibits a Medium Risk while vulnerabilities #1, #4 and #5 present the Highest
Risk. In the next step, we identify controls for the risks.
3.7 Step 7: Control Recommendations
In the previous steps, we identified and rated some of the major risks in the system
we analyze (see Figure 3.15). In this final step, we provide controls (countermea-
sures) to mitigate some of the identified risks. Risk Mitigation covers the means to
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Figure 3.15: Risk Description Table
reduce the risk level to an acceptable one by reducing the likelihood of occurrence,
the impact or both.
Low Risks
Vulnerability #3 (sensors are power restricted devices) portrays a Low Risk that
is acceptable. Offering countermeasures is difficult because the restriction on the
sensors is inherent to nodes themselves. To increase the battery or computational
power of a sensor is not a trivial task.
Medium Risks
Vulnerability #2 (sensor nodes are physically accessible and not tamper resistant)
presents a Medium Risk. Unfortunately, there are not many technical controls that
can be suggested to mitigate this risk. The most effective countermeasures are the
training of patients to lock their doors and the installation of a burglar alarm.
High Risks
Vulnerability #1, #4 and #5 present a High Risk. Sensor Data can be secured
against loss of confidentiality and integrity between each component (e.g. between
sensors, between the gateway and the middleware). This security protection is
achieved by using mechanisms inherent to each component such as the AES-CBC-
MAC construction (see section 4.4) inside of the WSN. However, such controls only
partially mitigate the risk of vulnerabilities #4 and #5. This is because hop-by-hop
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5 security does not prevent data from theft or alteration if components are compro-
mised. This means that even if all communication channels are secured but that a
component is malicious, the data is not secure.
Based on those findings we identify a clear lack of security for sensor data. Since
hop-by-hop security is not mitigating the risks in an acceptable way, we envision
end-to-end security as being the solution for the secure integration of WSNs into
business applications. This means that sensor data is protected against unautho-
rized disclosure and loss of confidentiality from the sensors to the users.
To mitigate the risk of Vulnerabilities #1, #4 and #5 we present a security scheme
(see Chapter 4) relying on cryptography [83]. The scheme offers end-to-end confi-
dentiality from sensor nodes to data consumers.
3.8 Conclusion
In the previous sections we performed a Risk Analysis using the NIST 800-30
methodology [65]. We went through a lengthy process of identifying threats, vulner-
abilities, evaluating likelihoods, impacts and risk to determine what can go wrong
and what the associated consequences are. One of the most difficult parts of the
risk assessment process was the determination of likelihood and impact ratings that
each vulnerability is given. System characterization and threat identification are
based on our knowledge, whereas likelihood and impact evaluations are based on
our predictions. This is a subjective task and the outcome should be treated with
caution.
We believe that Risk Analysis is an important step in both the design and running
phase of a project. Without it, an organization might spend too many resources in
terms of computational power, money or time on eliminating risks that might not
require any action at all. With Risk Analysis however, organizations get a solid base
to determine how to distribute their resources in order to mitigate risk and secure
their systems.
In order to obtain more objective ratings in the process, we would require much
more statistical data (e.g. about likelihood and impact of possible attacks). How-
ever from our findings, not many such statistics exist about vulnerabilities in WSNs.
In many articles such as [22], the authors present attacks and countermeasures for
WSNs, but rarely consider the likelihood or the impact any such attack could have.
As mentioned previously, we identified a clear need for end-to-end confidentiality
on sensor data. To fill this requirement we present a security scheme in chapter 4
that uses cryptography to achieve end-to-end security from WSNs to users. We also
analyze the scheme’s security which had not been performed by the authors of the
scheme.
5By hop-by-hop security we mean that the data is secure during the transmission between any
two entities. However the entities are able to read the data before forwarding it to the next one.
This is in contrast to end-to-end security where the intermediate actors are not able to decrypt the
data. Only the originator and the end receiver are able to read the data.
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It is important to notice that Risk Analysis refers to the system only whereas Secu-
rity Analysis refers to protocols or mechanisms only.
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CHAPTER 4
SECURITY SCHEME
”The only truly secure system is one
that is powered off, cast in a block of concrete
and sealed in a lead-lined room with armed guards.”
Gene Spafford
Our risk assmessment raises the importance of sensor data privacy. We have shown
that the impact on the system is significant if this vulnerability is exploited by an
attacker.
In this section, we address this requirement based on end-to-end confidentiality of
sensor data relying on [83]. This security scheme insures end-to-end confidentiality
of sensor data from its producer (e.g. node) to the business applications. Based on a
symmetric encryption scheme, a unique key is used for encryption and decryption of
sensor data. This security scheme is of particular interest for us, because it addresses
resource restriction on sensor nodes.
In order to manage encryption keys between sensor nodes and business applica-
tions, the authors propose an access control mechanism. In combination with a
classification of sensor data types, and business application roles (based on their
credential), an authorization class tree is defined.
Further details on the scheme can be found in section 4.2. As mentioned in the
previous chapter, the authors only provide a rough security analysis of their scheme.
We provide a security analysis of the security scheme in section 4.3.
Sensor nodes produce, on a broadcast medium, highly diverse data, which is of-
ten very sensitive. There may be many users using the system, each with different
access rights to access the wireless sensor data produced by sensors. This problem
of multiple-resources/multiple-accesses is conventionally solved using access control.
Access control is the ability to permit or deny access to a particular resource
by a particular entity (e.g. User, Program) [67].
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In a classical access control mechanism, an entity (e.g. User, Program) authen-
ticates itself, receives a credential, produces that credential to the resource manager
and receives a special stream of data the requesting entity is authorised for.
Authenticators are based on at least one of the following factors:
Something you know. Passwords or Personal Identification Numbers (PIN) usu-
ally make up this category.
Something you have. This includes smart cards, or any token based device.
Something you are. Any body part with sufficient biometric traits can be used
as an authentication factor. The most commonly used ones are fingerprints,
voice recognition, retina or iris scans.
After being authenticated, the user needs to be associated with rights of what he/she
can do in the system. These rights are usually a variation of the following basic ac-
cess types: Read (R) and/or Write (W).
Although there are many solutions to deal with access control in the literature [89],
none of them are suitable in the context of Wireless Sensor Networks. This is due to
the technical constraints that exist on the nodes, as mentioned in Chapter 2.1.1. On
top of those technical limitations, the sensor data is generated and transmitted in
real-time, which makes the establishment of multiple data streams with the sensor
nodes very difficult, if not impossible.
The need for a hierarchical access control scheme
In many scenarios where WSNs are used, sensor nodes are required to sense a large
range of different data types. In the remote patient monitoring scenario (see Chapter
2.3), ambient sensors sense room occupancy, room temperature, motion and activity
while body sensors sense blood pressure, HRV, GSR, SpO2, glucose rate and others.
The sensed data is usually highly sensitive and has different “levels” of sensitiv-
ity. For instance, the room occupancy in a hospital might not be highly sensitive
as it can be determined quite easily by other means such as light usage or by sight,
however the ECG chart of a patient is highly private and should only be accessible
by a small finite set of users.
Furthermore there are many actors which might be interested in the delivered sen-
sor data, e.g. nurses, patients, relatives, general practitioners (GP) and specialists.
These actors can be organized in a hierarchy depending on the access rights they are
entitled to. Low sensitivity data can be accessed by low level entities and conversely
high level sensitivity data can be accessed by high level entities in the hierarchy only.
In [83], the authors propose a hierarchical access control scheme based on cryp-
tography. The data is encrypted at the source and thus its access is intrinsically
restricted. This approach enables the nodes to publish encrypted data without be-
ing concerned about its present or future consumers. Thanks to the key generation
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mechanism proposed, multiple consumers with different access rights (e.g. nurse and
physician) can converge on the same decryption key if their privileges allow them
to. The presented scheme satisfies two very desirable goals for WSNs: it does not
use complex operations and it is independent of the data consumers. The scheme
description is given in Section 4.2.
4.1 Attacker Model
In this section some terminology will be introduced. We then present an adversary
model based on the popular Dolev-Yao model [30]. It is useful to define the model
under which an attacker can act, because it would be difficult to study or analyze the
security of a security mechanism without relying on a well-defined attacker model.
Indeed, how can we secure a system if we do not know what an attacker is able to
do?
4.1.1 Terminology
Selfish and malicious are two terms that falsely can be considered as synonyms. A
selfish (self-caring, egoistic) person could be considered as “nasty/mean” (malicious).
However a malicious person is not necessarily selfish, as his goal might be to just
do harm, without trying to gain a personal advantage. However, in the context of
wireless networks, and particularly in wireless sensor networks, it is appropriate to
separate them clearly.
• A misbehavior is the action of a party or group of parties consisting in
deliberately departing from the standardized or otherwise publicly available
prescribed behaviour in order to reach a specific goal [20, Def 3.1].
• A misbehavior is selfish if it aims at obtaining an advantage that can be
quantitatively expressed in units (such as bit rate, joules). Any other behaviour
is considered to be malicious. [20, Def 3.2]
For example, an attacker trying to increase his share of the bandwidth (at the
expense of others) is selfish. However, a denial-of-service attack is considered
as malicious.
• An attacker/adversary is a party or a group of parties that reflects malicious
and/or selfish behavior.
• An attacker/adversary model enumerates the precise cryptographic infor-
mation available to the adversary carrying out an attack [85].
4.1.2 Dolev-Yao
The first popular adversary model in security is the one defined by Dolev-Yao in
1981 [30]. This model makes several assumptions about the attacker. In particular,
• The attacker can be a legitimate party of the system. When a registered
user in a system starts to misbehave, he is considered an attacker.
• The attacker can send and receive any messages in the system.
37
4.1. ATTACKER MODEL C. Trefois - MSc Thesis 08
• The attacker can be anywhere in the system.
• The attacker cannot break the used cryptographic primitives.
However, this model is very general and needs to be adapted to the system at hand.
Before knowing which modifications have to be performed to the model above, clear
and concise security goals have to be set.
4.1.3 Security Requirements
Legal regulations on healthcare [32] aim at preserving the patient’s privacy regard-
ing their electronic medical data. The derived security goals are thus the protection
against service disruption (e.g. hindering the medical staff to access medical data),
destruction of, or modification of data, data theft and access control on sensor data
and alerts.
The following security requirements are therefore defined in the context of the
healthcare scenario in order to achieve these goals. There may be other security
requirements such as preserving the anonymity of the patient’s identity but those
requirements are out of scope of this thesis.
Sensor Data Availability. This requirement deals with service disruption. Avail-
ability of sensor data is of high importance if one considers monitoring a patient
remotely. In order to successfully and quickly respond to an emergency case,
the sensor data must be available to physicians at anytime and without much
latency. Failure to do so could result in the patient’s health degrading or in
the worst case, could come death for example because the doctor did not have
access to the vital signs of the patient. Also, it should be possible to alert a
member of the medical staff at anytime.
Sensor Data Confidentiality. This requirement deals with the preservation of
the data privacy. The objective is to ensure confidentiality of sensor data
exchanged between the patient’s sensor nodes and the data consumer.
Sensor Data Integrity. This requirement deals with the assurance that sensor
data has not been tampered. Indeed, the modification of sensor data could
greatly endanger the patient.
Access Control. Sensor data and the generated alerts must only be accessible by
authorized users (e.g. Nurse, Physician, GP). The access control on sensor
data should also be flexible enough to adapt itself depending on the current
context. For example, every physician should have access to the patient’s
medical data in case of an emergency.
4.1.4 Adapted Adversary Model
Our system (Figure 4.1) consists of a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN), a network
on which the data is transmitted (Wireless and the Internet) and several end users
(e.g. nurse, family relatives, physician).
After having identified four security requirements in the previous section, the adver-
sary model defined in Section 4.1.2 can now be fine-grained in the following way:
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Figure 4.1: System
• The attacker can eavesdrop all communications in the system, be it when
the data is sent over a wireless channel, or through a wired line. Unlike wired
networks, where physical access to the wire can usually be protected (e.g.
by putting the wire into walls or underground), in wireless communications
the attacker just needs to be in proximity of the device range to be able to
eavesdrop.
• The attacker can be anywhere in the system. As depicted in Figure 4.1, the
attacker can either be, in proximity of the Wireless Sensor Network, anywhere
between the gateway and the end user, or be an actual user of the system.
• The attacker can be an authorized user with a certain authorization level
(i.e. physician in the healthcare scenario).
• Nodes in the WSN can be compromised. A node is said to be compromised
when its underlying cryptographic material has been disclosed to the attacker.
A node can also be compromised in a natural way, if its hardware fails for
example.
• Cryptographic primitives used in the system are considered to be secure. By
secure we mean that it should not be feasible for an attacker to break the
cryptographic algorithms used in the cryptographic systems.
4.2 Scheme Description
As mentioned previously, we now introduce an existing security scheme [83] that
offers end-to-end confidentiality of sensor data from the sensor nodes to the business
applications. It guarantees the fulfilment of this requirement by using symmetric
key encryption. Since both encryption and decryption keys are the same, a problem
of key distribution occurs. The authors introduce a central Access Control Module
in charge of distributing the necessary cryptographic material needed to generate
the keys.
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Figure 4.2: Example mapping of data types and roles to the Authorization Class
Tree
In this section we discuss the key generation algorithm and the role of the Ac-
cess Control Module. Further information can be found in the scheme’s paper [83]
which we conveniently added as addendum to this thesis.
4.2.1 Key Generation
First, based on their level of sensitivity, a classification of sensor data is established.
Data whose disclosure does not raise high privacy issues is mapped on low autho-
rization classes while highly sensitive data is mapped to high authorization classes.
An example mapping is given in Figure 4.2.
The encryption mechanism uses the One-Time Pad as cryptographic algorithm. To
comply with its requirement of never reusing a key twice, each generated key is
unique. The encryption key is the output of a hash function h and is computed
using the following formula for authorization class ACi:
Key = h(KT ||Tgw||AC0||AC1||...||ACi||HMACTgw(seq||id))
First a secret pseudo-random seed KT is picked and the hash is updated with both
KT and Tgw = HMAC(KT , GW ) where GW is a grant window during which the
keys are valid.
Second, a hash tree with pseudo-random values is created like in Figure 4.7, where
AC0 is a public pseudo-random value. We see that now the Authorization Classes
from Figure 4.2 have been mapped to different cryptographic material. Following
the hierarchical organization of the sensor data classification, this material allows to
derive keys for any lower authorization class. The hash h is further updated with a
concatenation of AC values where the value of each
AC = HMAC(AClevelabove, ACcurrentlevel)
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until the authorization class ACi is reached. For example in figure 4.7, we have
V (AC3) = HMAC(V (AC1), AC3) which is the hash value for authorization class
AC3.
Finally, the h is finalized with the output of HMACTgw(seq||id) where seq||id is
the concatenation of the sequence number and the sensor id. Each sensor has a
different id and the sequence number is incremented for each data packet sent.
4.2.2 Access Control Module
The Access Control Module is in charge of distributing cryptographic material to
the sensor nodes and to the business applications. Based on the Credential of busi-
ness applications, the ACM assesses their authorization classes and provides them
with the necessary decryption material. This cryptographic material includes two
elements: (i) the partial hash value and (ii) Tgw.
For example, the cryptographic material sent to sensor nodes and business applica-
tions which are on Authorization Class AC2 during a grant window GW is:{
Partial Hash = h(KT ||HMAC(KT , GW )||AC0||AC1||AC2
Tgw = HMAC(KT , GW )
Using this material, both the sensor nodes and the business applications just have
to perform the last step of the key generation to converge on the same encryption
respectively decryption key. As explained previously, this step is the update of the
hash h with HMACTgw(seq||id). Additionally, this cryptographic material can be
used to derive any keys for lower authorization classes then for which the material
was issued.
4.3 Security Analysis
The authors in [83] have barely analyzed the security of their scheme. Thus, it seems
appropriate to analyze the scheme’s security in greater detail. We can classify the
possible attacks into two categories: outside attacks and inside attacks.
In an outside attack, the adversary is not inherent to the system we consider. Ex-
amples of outside attacks are known-plaintext attacks, compromise sensor nodes,
hijacking the Access Control Module and performing a denial-of-service attack on
the ACM.
Conversely, in an inside attack, the attacker is part of the system. Typically an
inside attack occurs when at some point in time a legitimate user starts to misbe-
have. An example of an inside attack is when a user tries to escalate his rights in
order to gain access to a resource he is not entitled to.
For each attack we mentioned above, we will provide a deeper analysis in the next
part.
41
4.3. SECURITY ANALYSIS C. Trefois - MSc Thesis 08
(a) OTP (b) XOR
Figure 4.3: One Time Pad
4.3.1 Outside Attacks
4.3.1.1 Known Plaintext Attack
The Attack
An outside attacker (i.e. a non-registered member of the network), after eavesdrop-
ping sensor data, can try to perform a known-plaintext attack [57] in order to retrieve
the key used for encryption. In a known-plaintext attack, the adversary has a quan-
tity of plaintext and corresponding ciphertext. This is a reasonable assumption in
the case of WSNs, as the attacker might deploy his own sensors in order to acquire
the clear value.
Countermeasure
The scheme makes use of the One Time Pad [55] as cryptographic algorithm. It
consists of combining the plaintext with a random key (called pad) that is as long
as the plaintext and never reused twice. When the key is truly random, used only
once and kept secret, then the OTP provides perfect secrecy (proven in [77]. As a
reminder, Figure 4.3(a) shows how the encryption and decryption parts of an OTP
work.
The symmetric key used to encrypt a particular plaintext can easily be determined
by performing a XOR operation (see Figure 4.3(b)) on the ciphertext and the plain-
text, or Key = Cipher ⊕ Plaintext .
In symmetric-key encryption, the encryption key KENC and the decryption key
KDEC are the same. In contrast to this, in asymmetric-key encryption, the en-
cryption and decryption keys (KENC and KDEC) are different. It is considered as
a “hard” problem to compute the decryption key KENC from the encryption key
KDEC [20, A2].
The retrieved key does not however represent the whole key of the OTP, but only a
small fraction of it. One of the requirements that ensure perfect secrecy in an OTP
is that the key must have the same size as the whole plaintext, and never be reused
twice. This is the case in this scheme, since the whole key is made out of many
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sub-keys that each are statistically independent.
At best, this attack is able to retrieve the small sub-key that was used to encrypt
just this chunk of data. It is thus clear that the retrieved key cannot be used to
decrypt any other blocks of data or to derive any part of the whole key.
Since the perfect secrecy of the OTP has been proven by Shannon in [76], other
attacks such as ciphertext-only or chosen-plaintext attacks are not possible.
Data Origin Problem
Once the attacker has performed a known-plaintext attack and retrieved the sub-key,
he is able to insert forged messages into the system. However, the scheme we are
analysing only deals with access control and inherently with confidentiality and not
with data origin. This problem is therefore out of scope of this analysis.
4.3.1.2 Compromised Sensor Nodes
Sensors can be compromised in two ways, intentionally or unintentionally [73].
A sensor node is unintentionally compromised if some of its hardware is failing
or if the battery is low. In this case, the sensor’s accuracy might diminish and the
acquired data might not be trustworthy any longer.
A node is intentionally compromised when an adversary actively tries to obtain
the cryptographic material on the node. The attacker also could intentionally drain
the battery of the sensor to render it unreliable or unavailable.
Since both of these ways can cause damage to the network, we can consider them as
attackers.
Attack
In Wireless Sensor Networks, sensor nodes are not tamper-resistant [92] due to the
fact that they have low-cost and low-power requirements. Due to restrictions on
sensor hardware and software, the security protection becomes weaker. An attacker
can therfore easily capture a node (e.g. by stealing the node). Once a sensor node
has been compromised, all of its cryptographic material (all secret information, keys)
are disclosed to the attacker.
After obtaining the cryptographic material of a node, the attacker can dissemi-
nate forged data in a secure and valid manner or insert new malicious nodes into
the network.
Countermeasure
There are different approaches to deal with detecting compromised nodes: sensor
node failure detection, alert based identification of compromised nodes, reputation
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systems and trust based frameworks.
Failing Sensor Nodes
A sensor node is failing if it is unresponsive, starts sending incorrect data due to
malfunctioning or when it is maliciously compromised. To improve resilience to sen-
sor node failure, some approaches propose that sensors detect their own failure [47]
(e.g. by detecting physical malfunctions or battery usage) or their neighbours failure
[44].
Alert Based Identification of Compromised Nodes
In [91], the authors propose a framework for identifying compromised nodes based
on alerts. They develop an alert reasoning algorithm where each node evaluates
their security estimate on their neighbours. The nodes raise alerts when a problem
is detected and the base station of the WSN intercepts those alerts.
Reputation Systems
Reputation systems try to identify compromised nodes by analyzing their behav-
ior. The reputation of a node is the collection of ratings maintained by others about
that node. There are many approaches for reputation based systems ([18], [37], [59])
and they usually base their reputation evaluation on the nodes and not on the data.
In some cases, like in the healthcare domain (see Section 2.3), the data itself is
as important as its origin, if not more. From this point of view it is important to
consider both the trust and the origin of the data, rather than focusing only on
the origin.
Trust Based Frameworks
Trust based frameworks aim at establishing a confidence level either between sen-
sor nodes or on the data itself. The former can be referred to as entity-centric trust
frameworks ([88], [86]), while the latter can be considered as data-centric trust frame-
works ([73],[92]). Trust is often described as the expectation of cooperative behavior,
or in other words, the expectation that the sensors will deliver non-compromised
data.
In the healthcare scenario, WSNs deliver sensitive data about the patient’s health
status. While trust on the identity of the nodes is important, trust on the data itself
is as useful. Data-centric frameworks, such as [73], use a-priori trust relationships
in nodes as one of the parameters to establish trust on the data itself.
Access Control Module
The Access Control Module (ACM), introduced in 4.2, is responsible of distributing
the cryptographic material to the sensor nodes and delivering grants to authenticat-
ing users. Once a compromised node has been identified (using one of the methods
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Figure 4.4: Hijacked System
mentioned above for example), the ACM can issue new cryptographic material to
non-compromised nodes using the rekeying method detailed in 4.2. As soon as the
nodes start to use the new cryptographic material issued by the ACM, the attacker
can no longer insert valid forged messages into the network.
4.3.1.3 Hijacking the Access Control Module
Introduction
An attacker can impersonate the real Access Control Module in order to harm the
system (as depicted in Figure 4.4). There are many ways to successfully execute this
attack: DNS Spoofing, MAC Spoofing, IP Spoofing or Physical Capture. We will
briefly describe each of the attacks and their solutions below.
When the attacker succeeds in impersonating the ACM, the whole system breaks
down: (i) legitimate users sending their credentials to the compromised ACM (the
fake one or the captured one) will receive fake Grants in a seemingly truthful man-
ner and (ii), the decryption of sensor data using these fake grants will fail and thus
render the system unfunctional.
Furthermore, the adversary then has all of the authenticating user’s credentials in
his possesion because the attacker can store the credentials he “stole”. Depending
on the type of credential the system is using (e.g. a simple login/password), the at-
tacker can use those stolen credentials to mount other attacks, such as impersonating
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users. We can however safely assume that the Access Control Module has enough
resources to implement stronger authentication mechanisms (e.g. using Public Key
Infrastructures) such as X.509 certificates [9].
Hijacking Possibilities
DNS Spoofing
The basic task of DNS (Domain Name System [58]) is to translate hostnames to
IP addresses (e.g. it holds records such as www.example.com ⇒ 208.77.188.166).
Each domain (e.g. example.com) has one or more DNS servers that publish infor-
mation about it. Since there are billions of domains, each DNS server can not hold
all mappings (due to scalability problems). To solve this problem, DNS servers query
each other to find the requested information.
DNS spoofing is the art of making a DNS entry point to an IP address it is not
supposed to point to. An adversary mounting a dns spoofing attack, is able to redi-
rect Internet traffic to an IP address of his choice. This means the attacker can
replace the ACM by redirecting traffic to his own fake ACM (as depicted in Figure
4.4). There are two ways to perform this attack: DNS cache poisoning and DNS ID
spoofing.
In DNS cache poisoning [75], the adversary needs his own DNS server. Most
DNS servers support ”recursive” queries. This means one can send a request to
any DNS server asking it to resolve any name-to-IP. The DNS server will then send
queries to other DNS servers in order to discover the required information (e.g. the
IP).
An adversary can predict what request the victim server will issue and spoof the
response. The fact that DNS servers cache information locally for a certain amount
of time is useful to the attacker. If he successfully spoofs a response, every legitimate
user of the poisoned DNS server will be redirected to the fake IP.
In DNS ID spoofing, the attacker sniffs (e.g. eavesdrop and store) or guess the
requestor’s query ID and then replies with a fake answer. This attack is shown in
Figure 4.5 and is also known as “impersonating” a DNS name server because the
attacker replies on the real DNS server’s behalf. Further details can be found in [7].
DNS Spoofing - Countermeasure
There are several approaches to prevent DNS spoofing attacks. For the best se-
curity, we should not rely on DNS at all. If the IP of the ACM (Access Control
Module) never changes by using a static IP for instance, then there is no need for
DNS. This would completely eliminate the DNS threats for the ACM. If the assump-
tion that the IP never changes is too strong, we can consider other solutions: using
secure DNS (e.g. using TLS [28]), limiting the cache on the DNS server or restricting
zone transfers [58].
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(a) Sniff DNS Request ID
(b) Spoofed DNS Response
Figure 4.5: Example of DNS ID Spoofing
MAC Spoofing
Every network interface controller (NIC) has an unique MAC (Media Access Con-
trol) address. On a local area network, computers use MAC addresses to identify
each other. MAC spoofing refers to altering the MAC address on a NIC. An adver-
sary can perform MAC spoofing to take over the ACM’s identity by changing his
own MAC address to the one the ACM is using. There are many tools to change
the MAC address of a NIC, (e.g. MAC Changer (for GNU/Linux) [68], SMAC (for
Windows) [49]).
There can be routing disambiguities when there are two identical MAC addresses
used on the same LAN. Therefore, once the attacker has changed his MAC address,
he can mount a Denial-of-Service Attack (see in IP Spoofing for more information)
on the ACM in order to make it completely unresponsive. Further technical details
can be found in [21].
MAC Spoofing - Countermeasure
A quick way to detect if a MAC address is compromised is to run RARP [35] (Re-
verse Address Resolution Protocol) against it. RARP maps a MAC address to an
IP Address. As only one MAC address should map to a single IP address, RARP
should return one IP address for one network device. Thus, if multiple IP’s are
returned for one MAC address, one can investigate if an attacker is present or not.
More advanced protection mechanisms include: special software like spygate fire-
walls, sticky ARP, MAC locking, ARP table-based MAC/IP filtering and New-IP
ARP lookups. The mechanisms are further detailed in [21].
47
4.3. SECURITY ANALYSIS C. Trefois - MSc Thesis 08
IP Spoofing
An IP (Internet Protocol [72]) address is a unique 32-bit address that devices on
a computer network (using TCP/IP [82]) use to communicate and identify each
other.
IP spoofing refers to altering the IP address of a malicious message (e.g. a packet)
to make it appear as coming from a trusted source (e.g. the real ACM). An attacker
may have several goals while mounting an IP spoofing attack; Session hijacking,
or Denial-of-Service (for more information on other attacks such as non-blind
spoofing, blind spoofing and Man in the Middle, the reader can refer to [87]).
Session hijacking can easily be achieved when the attacker is on the same subnet
as the victim (as further explained in [87]). After sniffing sequence and acknowledge-
ment numbers, an adversary can corrupt the datastream of an established connection
and then re-open a valid connection from the attacker machine using the sniffed in-
formation.
In a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack, the adversary floods the victim with as many
packets as possible in a short time to make the server unresponsive. He can rely on
IP spoofing to prolong the effectiveness of the attack. If the attacker changes the
source IP all the time, tracing and stopping a DoS attack becomes more tedious (it
is easier to detect an incoming flood from one IP address and to block it).
IP Spoofing - Countermeasure
To prevent an adversary from mounting an IP spoofing attack, there are several
countermeasures (presented in [87]) that can be implemented: filtering at the router
and using encryption and authentication.
Filtering at the router involves blocking certain source IP addresses from in-
coming and outgoing messages at the router. Implementing those so called ingress
and egress filters [34] help to limit attacks performed through IP spoofing.
Using encryption and authentication reduces IP spoofing threats considerably.
Since both features are included in IPv6 [25], the Access Control Module should
use IPv6 instead of IPv4 to guarantee some level of protection against IP spoofing
attacks.
Physical Capture
The machine on which the Access Control Module resides can be physically cap-
tured. By that we mean that an attacker can get access to the computer, e.g. by
breaking into the building in which the target machine is hosted. Once an intruder
has successfully gained access to the machine hosting the ACM, he can perfectly
impersonate it since he has complete control over the machine.
Physical Capture - Countermeasure
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To protect the ACM of such an attack, we can imagine two countermeasures. First,
the access to the computer on which the ACM is running should be restricted (e.g.
using RFID on the entrance door) and well protected physically (separating it from
other IT infrastructure for example).
Second, there should be mechanisms in the server room (such as video surveillance
and motion detectors) to monitor any activity and raise alerts in case of an intrusion.
Conclusion
Being aware of the attacks mentioned above and correctly implementing their coun-
termeasures provides the ACM with sufficient security to prevent the most common
Hijacking attempts.
4.3.2 Inside Attack
A legitimate user, i.e. a nurse, might switch to a malicious behavior at some point
in time and might escalate her rights to gain access to data she is not authorized to
(i.e. data from all patients, sensitive data only available to doctors, etc).
There are several ways for an attacker to try and escalate his rights:
Sibling Attack. A User can try to escalate his access rights by trying to derive a
key on the same level in the tree where the attacker is (e.g. a sibling). For
example, in Figure 4.6, the attacker could legitimately be on authorization
level AC3 and trying to derive the key for authorization level AC4.
Parent Attack. A user can try to escalate his rights by trying to derive the key of
his parent node in the classification tree. In Figure 4.6, the attacker could be
on authorization level AC5 and trying to derive the key for authorization level
AC2.
Coalition Attack. A coalition of two or more users from different authorization
levels (i.e. AC3 and AC2) could try to derive a key for a different level (i.e.
AC4 or AC0) by combining their cryptographic material.
The Sibling, Parent and Coalition Attack are discussed in the following sections.
Sibling Attack. The scheme proposes to makes use of the secure message authenti-
cation code HMAC [15] which does not allow existential forgery under chosen-
plaintext attacks.
HMAC is defined as follows:
HMACK(m) = h((K ⊕ opad)||h(K ⊕ ipad)||m))
where h is a cryptographic hash function (e.g. SHA-256 [64], Ripemd-160 [29]),
opad = 0x5C repeated 64 times and ipad = 0x36 repeated 64 times, K is the
secret Key and m is the message to hash. The underlying hash function of the
HMAC is supposed to be collision resistant.
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Figure 4.6: Authorization Class Hierarchy
Figure 4.7: Key Generation Tree
Existential Forgery under Chosen-Plaintext Attack
We suppose the attacker is able to gather some number of example pairs of
messages and their valid HMAC’s. He is also allowed to specify his own mes-
sage and receive the corresponding valid HMAC from an oracle [16] (black
box) implementing the scheme. Even then it is not possible, given many pairs
(mi, HMACK(mi)) , (i ∈ {1, ..., n}) for an attacker to findHMACK(mj) , j /∈
{1, ..., n} where K = Secret Key.
In Figure 4.7, we thus see that it is not feasible for an attacker that knows the
hash value of node AC3 (V (AC3)) to find the hash value V (AC4). From the
property outlined above, it is also not possible for a coalition of users sharing
their V (ACi)’s to derive a hash value of one of the siblings belonging to the
same authorization level, for instance for AC5.
Parent Attack. The one-way hash function (e.g. SHA-256 [64], RipeMD-160 [29]
(we use RipeMD-160 in the implementation)) used in the HMAC has to sat-
isfy collision, pre-image and second pre-image resistance [20] in order to be
considered reasonably secure.
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Collision Resistance Collision Resistance means that it is hard to find two
inputs m and m′ that hash to the same output, ie h(m) = h(m′). A pair
of inputs (m,m′) that produce the same hash is called a collision pair.
Pre-Image Resistance Pre-Image Resistance means that given a hash value
hash it is hard to find an input m such that h(m) = hash.
Sesond Pre-Image Resistance Second Pre-Image Resistance means that
given an input m, it is hard to find another input m′ (m′ 6= m) such that
h(m′) = h(m).
Collision resistance is the strongest of those three properties in the sense that
it implies both the pre-image and second pre-image resistance properties.
When h (the hash function) satisfies those properties, it becomes unfeasible
for node ACi to derive the value of his parent V (P (ACi)) from its own value
V (ACi) (where P (ACi) = {Parent Node of ACi}). This means an attacker
cannot escalate his rights in the tree (as in Figure 4.7).
Coalition Attack. A coalition attack is an attack where two or more users collabo-
rate in order to escalate their rights. However, this attack can be considered as
a sequence of sibling and parent attacks. Combining the Sibling and the Par-
ent Attack it is therefore not possible for a coalition of users to escalate their
rights, even though they share their cryptographic materials. As described in
Section 4.2, a user (legitimate or adversary) can thus only derive a new key
for one of his children, but not for his parent nor for his siblings.
4.4 Integrity of Wireless Sensor Data
So far, we introduced an access control scheme that offers a hierarchical access con-
trol (and inherently end-to-end confidentiality) of sensor data. However, another
identified important security requirement is data integrity. This security require-
ment is not filled with the scheme. In this section we introduce the concept of
Integrity and propose mechanisms to reach the goal of offering Integrity of Sensor
Data.
In Figure 4.8 we add the Access Control Module, which deals with authenticat-
ing users on one side and distributing cryptographic material to sensor nodes on the
other side. The Attacker Model we defined in Section 4.1.4 is still applicable for this
system.
Integrity is defined as a protection against unauthorized modification or destruc-
tion of information, in this case the sensitive value of the wireless sensor data [67].
As the sensor data is only transported between the Gateway and the User (Figure
4.8), without involving the ACM, we only analyze how the integrity of the sensor
data evolves between the WSN and the end user.
Inside the WSN
Inside the WSN, the 802.15.4 [80] protocol assures integrity if the AES-CBC-MAC
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Figure 4.8: System with Access Control Module
mode (see Figure 4.9) is selected as security suite.
Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code, abbreviated CBC-MAC, is
a technique for constructing a message authentication code (MAC) from a block
cipher (e.g. AES). A MAC is a short piece of information (e.g. 128 or 192 bits) used
to authenticate a message. The message m is divided into n blocks of the same size
and each block is encrypted using a block cipher (like AES) with key k. Figure 4.9
shows the CBC-MAC computation of a message m split into n blocks m1| . . . |mn
using a Block Cipher E (e.g. AES).
The interdependance created by the CBC operation mode (Figure 4.9) ensures that
any change of bits in the plaintext (even just one bit) will cause the final ciphertext
to be changed in an unpredictable way. This assertion holds only if the key k for
the block cipher (e.g. AES) is unknown to the attacker. The MAC value protects
both a message’s data integrity as well as its authenticity.
From the WSN to the User
When the data is transmitted over the Internet (e.g. Wireless or Ethernet) the
AES-CBC-MAC Security Suite from the 802.15.4 protocol is not usable anymore.
The basic protocols such as TCP and UDP do not offer data integrity, so additional
protocols need to be considered. Our research revealed IPSec [50] or TLS [28] as
possible protocols (the successor of Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)) to guarantee in-
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Figure 4.9: AES-CBC-MAC Construction
tegrity. IPSec operates at the network layer (Layer 3 in the OSI Model [94]) while
TLS operates on the transport layer and above (Layer4-7 in the OSI Model). Both
protocols authenticate and encrypt data packets between a sender and a receiver
and as such offer Data Integrity. It should be noted that both of the protocols add a
considerable overhead (in bits) to the data packets and as such might not be usable.
This is especially true for the packets travelling from the WSN sink to the Gateway.
If the usage of such a protocol is not possible due to technical constraints we can
append a Message Authentication Code (MAC) to the sensor data to maintain in-
tegrity.
4.5 Conclusion
In Chapter 3, we identified a clear need for end-to-end confidentiality of sensor data
when dealing with the integration of WSNs into business applications. To fullfill
this requirement, we introduced an efficient security scheme that uses symetric-key
encryption to guarantee data confidentiality. Furthermore, the scheme allows hier-
archical access control. This is useful given that sensor data and roles are mapped
to a hierarchy. Hierarchical access control thus becomes a necessity.
We then performed a security analysis of the scheme [83] since the authors barely dis-
cussed it in their paper. By analyzing both outside and inside attacks, the scheme
demonstrated satisfactory results given the Attacker Model we defined in Section
4.1.4. We found a few vulnerabilities at the Access Control Module level (e.g. DNS
/ MAC / IP spoofing attacks). In Section 4.3.1 we propose several countermeasures
for each attack to reduce those threats.
In Section 4.1.3 we identified data integrity as one of the major security require-
ments which unfortunately was out of scope in the scheme. Since this is a major
requirement, we showed how existing protocols can be leveraged to guarantee in-
tegrity of sensor data in Section 4.4.
As the security scheme relies on OTP for encryption and decryption, we have to
check whether the generated keys are pseudo-random or not. In order to be secure
in the random oracle model, the hash function needs to generate a pseudo-random
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key stream. In the paper [83], the authors assume that the generated keys are
pseudo-random. But to the best of our knowledge, hash functions have not been
used to generate pseudo-random key streams so far and as such we were unable to
find any indications on the randomness of such keys. For that reason, we decided to
perform a randomness evaluation on the generated key streams. We used the NIST
Statistical Test Suite [74] to perform this evaluation and the details can be found in
Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5
RANDOMNESS EVALUATION
”Statistics are no
substitute for judgment.”
Henry Clay
One of the major requirements of the scheme [83] we analyzed in Chapter 4 is that
the keys need to be pseudo-random [57, Chapter 5] so that the correlation between
them is so small as to discourage any statistical attacks on the ciphertext. The
randomness is dependent on both the choice of the hash function and the way it is
used in the construction of the keys. In our current implementation, we are using
RIPEMD-160 [29] as hash function for which there are no known attacks at the time
of this writing. In this chapter we will evaluate the randomness of the keys that are
generated by the scheme [83] using the NIST SP 800-22b test battery.
The NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) Test Suite SP 800-22b
(detailed in [74]) is a statistical package consisting of 15 tests. These tests evaluate
the randomness of a given sequence of keys.
The NIST organization provides an ANSI C implementation of that test battery
which can be freely downloaded from [11]. DIEHARD [54] is another free of charge
package that offers a variety of statistical tests. However, many of the tests are
based on the NIST 800-22b package and so we choose NIST to perform the testing.
5.1 Parameter Choices
For each test, the NIST test suite extracts a probability, called the p-value. The
p-value is a summary of the strength of the analyzed sequence against a perfectly
random one. A p-value of 0 suggests that the sequence is completely non-random.
We denote α as the confidence level which typically ranges from 0.001 to 0.01 [74].
Let Seq be the sequence of bits, then for each test we have
Randomness(Seq) =
{
True , if p− value > α
False , if p− value < α
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Figure 5.1: List of Tests and their Description
NIST recommends running the tests on 1’000 sequences of keys with each sequence
having at least 106 bits in order to determine if a key stream is random or not.
We generated 107 keys of 160 bits each using our implementation of the scheme
[83]. The resulting 1.6 Gib file was then used as input for the 15 tests. Each test
was run on 1’000 sequences of 105 keys.
The significance level α was set to 0.01, which is the suggested level when deal-
ing with cryptography [74, 4.3.f]. This means that if a p-value > 0.01 the sequence
is accepted as random with a confidence of 99%. Similarly, if a p-value < 0.01, the
sequence is non-random with confidence of 99%.
Figure 5.1 shows a list of the 15 tests of the NIST Suite with a short description of
each. For more details about the tests, the reader can refer to [74]. In Figure 5.2, we
show the input parameters we used to perform the battery of tests. The values for
each test satisfy the conditions set in the NIST document (see [74, Chapter 2]). For
the tests not mentioned here, we used the default parameters suggested by NIST.
5.2 Results
There are two suggested approaches to interpret the results of the NIST Test Suite.
The first one deals with the examination of the proportion of sequences that pass
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Figure 5.2: Parameter Choices for the Test Suite
the test while the second one focuses on the uniformity of the p-values. The two
approaches are discussed in the sections below.
Approach 1: Examination of Proportion of Passing Sequences
The final analysis report generated by the suite contains a value called proportion for
each test. The proportion is the number of sequences that passed (e.g. with p-value
> 0.01 = α) divided by the total number of sequences tested. In other words, the
proportion is the percentage of passed tests.
NIST specifies a range of acceptable proportions determined by using the confi-
dence level defined as pˆ± 3
√
pˆ(1−pˆ)
m , where pˆ = 1− α and m is the sample size (e.g.
1’000).
In our case, we used m = 1’000 sequences and each sequence had 1.6 Mib bits.
Using the formula for the confidence level above, our range of acceptable propor-
tions is from 0.9805 to 0.9994. Figure 5.3 shows the proportion for each test. Since
the proportion for each test lies within the range we computed, we can accept the
sequence as a random bit sequence.
Approach 2: Examination of the Uniformity of p-values
The second approach presented by NIST is the analysis of the uniformity of the
p-values. If the p-values form a uniform distribution, then we accept the sequence
as random.
Chi-Square Test
Uniformity can be examined by performing a χ2 (Chi-Square) test on the p-values,
with
χ2 =
10∑
i=1
(Ci − m10)2
m
10
where Ci is the number of p-values in the sub-interval [ i−110 ,
i
10), i = 1. . . 10 and m is
the sample size (the number of sequences tested, e.g. 1’000). Finally, a new pΓ-value
is computed from the original p-value as
pΓ − value = igamc(χ
2
2
,
9
2
)
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Figure 5.3: Passing Proportion of the 15 NIST Tests
Figure 5.4: Uniformity Distribution of p-values
where igamc is the Incomplete Gamma Function as defined in [74, Section 5.3.3].
Finally, the
p− values =
{
Uniform, if pΓ > 0.0001
Non− Uniform, if pΓ < 0.0001
Figure 5.4 shows the pΓ-values for the tests we conducted. From the table we see
that all test passed the uniformity condition and thus the sequence is random.
We omitted the Fast Fourier Transform test from the examination of uniformity as
the results were not usable. Furthermore, in [51], the authors state that the results of
the FFT test are degrading when the number of sequences increases. In particular,
if the number of sequences is bigger than 10’000, then any Pseudo-Random Number
Generator fails the uniformity test. For that reason, we decided not to include this
test in the uniformity evaluation.
The evaluation of uniformity for the Linear Complexity test raises an exception
when we run it. At this point we are still investigating the cause of this as we are
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(a) Cumulative Sum Test (b) Serial Test
Figure 5.5: Histograms for the Cumulative Sum 5.5(a) and Serial Test 5.5(b)
not aware of the reasons behind the failing of this test. In order not to bias our
results by using erroneous values, we decided to remove the Linear Complexity test
from the Uniformity Evaluation.
Visual Analysis
In addition to the chi-square test we also can visually examine the distribution
of the p-values by plotting them into a histogram. The horizontal axis (the prob-
abilities) ranging from 0 to 1 is divided into 10 even sub-intervals. The number of
p-values within each sub-interval is displayed on the vertical axis. As an example,
Figure 5.5 shows the histograms of p-values for the Cumulative Sums and the Serial
Test. We have found similar results for the other tests. All histograms are depicted
in Appendix A. We see that the p-values are uniformly distributed for every test we
performed and thus the sequence we provided can be considered as random.
5.3 Conclusion
In this chapter we evaluated the randomness of the key streams generated by the
scheme in [83]. We conducted this evaluation using the NIST SP 800-22b Test Suite
[74] that provides a battery of statistical tests to evaluate the randomness of binary
sequences. We ran each of the 15 tests 1’000 times with sequences of 1.6 Mib each.
We then interpreted the results using two different methods suggested by NIST,
(i) examination of the proportion of passing sequences and (ii) examination of the
uniformity of the p-values.
The NIST SP 800-22b Test Suite states that if a sequence of 1 Gib passes all of
the 15 tests, then that sequence can be considered as random [74]. Based on the re-
sults of the proportion analysis and the uniformity distributions outlined in Section
5.2, we conclude that the input file (consisting of 1.6 billion bits) we provided to the
NIST Test Suite is pseudo-random.
These results seem to confirm that using hash functions lead to pseudo-random key
generators. Furthermore, we showed that the way keys are computed (e.g. by incre-
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menting a counter for each key) seems to preserve pseudo-randomness and could be
compared to other pseudo-random number generators (PNRGs) [57] such as Blum
Blum Shub [17] or Fortuna [33].
Besides generating random key streams, the hash function needs to verify the col-
lision resistance property we outlined in section 4.3.2. In Cryptography, a brute
force collision search has a time and memory complexity of
√
2n where n is the hash
size [57]. This means that for a hash of 160 bits, the complexity is
√
2160 = 280 =
1.20892582 × 1024. Thus, if we suppose that the computation of a hash takes 1
[ns], then a brute force attack requires 38 million years to be successful. This means
that if no statistical attacks are known, the hash function can be considered collision
resistant.
In the next chapter, we proceed with the secure integration of WSNs into busi-
ness applications by implementing the scheme. First, we provide a proof-of-concept
completely in Java to prove the feasibility of the scheme. Second, we describe how
a hardware prototype using real sensor nodes was developed with Cisco Systems
France. Last but not least, we present some empirical performance evaluations for
the scheme implemented on the hardware nodes.
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CHAPTER 6
IMPLEMENTATION
”First, solve the problem.
Then, write the code.”
John Johnson
In order to prove the feasibility of the access control scheme, we implemented two
prototypes: (i) the first one is a simulation of WSNs and is fully implemented in
Java, (ii) the second one integrates real sensors implementing the key generation and
encryption algorithm in collaboration with Cisco. In this Chapter, we detail both
of these proof-of-concepts.
6.1 Java Simulation
Simulation is a cheap, quick and reliable way to test a system before deploying it
onto real hardware. The advantage of providing such a proof-of-concept is that it can
be run completely on one machine and its only functional requirement is the Java
Virtual Machine (JVM). The choice of Ptolemy II [4] as simulation environment for
the WSN enables us to host the WSN behavior, the Middleware and the Business
Applications on the same machine even if all components are independent. In Figure
6.1 we show the global architecture of our simulation environment.
There are four major components in our system: (i) the Ptolemy II framework
which simulates the WSN, (ii) the Enterprise Integration Component (a mediation
layer between the WSN and Applications), the Access Control Module (in charge of
the grant distribution) and the Backend Applications (e.g. web-based applications
consuming data). Each of these components is discussed in the sections below.
6.1.1 Ptolemy II
Ptolemy II is a Java based Simulation Framework to simulate Wireless Sensor Net-
works (see Figure 6.2). Further details about Ptolemy II can be found in [63, Chapter
4]. In Figure 6.2, we show what a WSN model can look like with Ptolemy II. The
possibility to make the model look like a real use case technically speaking (e.g.
61
6.1. JAVA SIMULATION C. Trefois - MSc Thesis 08
Figure 6.1: Java Simulation Architecture
Figure 6.2: Ptolemy II Customized Model View
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Figure 6.3: Ptolemy Class Diagram
patient monitoring) is an interesting feature of Ptolemy II. Furthermore, each com-
ponent in Ptolemy II (e.g. Sensors and Gateways) is represented by a Java Object.
There are two main components: Sensor and Gateway. A Sensor is derived from
a Ptolemy Source Actor which is a generic agent for any wireless source. On the
other hand, the Gateway is derived from a Ptolemy Sink Actor which is a generic
component for wireless sinks. The Class diagram of the Ptolemy II part is depicted
in Figure 6.3.
Sensor
The Sensor class is derived from a Ptolemy Source Actor and deals with the pro-
duction, encryption and transmission to the Gateway of encrypted sensor data. Ad-
ditionally, each Sensor has its own CryptographicMaterial object which holds all
the cryptographic material attached to that node (e.g. KT, AC0, GW). The main
sequence of actions performed by the Sensor Class is summarized in Figure 6.4.
The encryption of the Sensor Data is done according to the scheme we discussed
in Chapter 4. The CryptoEngine class implements the encryption algorithm and
computes the encryption keys based on the parameters the Sensor provides. We use
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Figure 6.4: Ptolemy Sensor Actor Sequence Diagram
RIPEMD-160 [29] as cryptographic hash function for the key generation. RIPEMD-
160 has no known attacks at the time of this writing and is collision resistant.
The parameters used for the encryption are:
• KT: The Secret Value KT
• AC0: The root of the Authorization Class Tree
• GW: The Grant Window
• AC span: The Authorization Class Spanning Tree (e.g. 1,2,1)
• ID: The ID number of the Sensor
• Seq: The Sequence Number of the Sensed Data (incremented for each sensor
data)
Currently, the Secret KT and AC0 are pre-configured inside of the Sensor Class at
design time because the key distribution is currently not implemented.
Figure 6.5 shows the sequence diagram of the encryption part. When the Sen-
sor Class is instantiated, it creates a new CryptographicMaterial object and assigns
the parameters GW, KT, AC span, ID and AC0 to it. Afterwards, each time a Sen-
sor Data is produced, the sequence number Seq is incremented and the associated
CryptographicMaterial object is updated.
The Sensor object then asks the CryptoEngine to create a key based on the param-
eters inside the CryptographicMaterial object. Finally, the Sensor Data is encrpyted
using the generated key and is sent to the Gateway. The packet that is sent to the
Gateway contains the following elements required for the decryption key computa-
tion:
{SensorDataEncrypted, GW, ID, Seq,ACspan}
Gateway
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Figure 6.5: Ptolemy Sensor Data Encryption Sequence Diagram
The Gateway class is responsible for the delivery of acquired sensor data from the
WSN to the middleware (Enterprise Integration Component). The structure of the
Gateway is depicted in Figure 6.3. It is a derived from a Ptolemy Sink Actor which
is a generic Wireless Sink. Its main purpose is to keep a list of all available nodes
and to forward incoming data to the EIC. The communication between the Gateway
and the EIC is done via Java RMI (Remote Method Invocation) [5].
6.1.2 Middleware (EIC)
The Enterprise Integration Component (EIC) is a high level middleware to support
seamless integration of WSNs into Business Applications. It is designed on a SOA
(Serivce Oriented Architecture) based architecture. The EIC is running on the SAP
Netweaver Application Server1 which is “the common technology platform for SAP
business applications, providing the foundation for enterprise SOA amongst oth-
ers”2. For a quick introduction about the SOA paradigm the reader can refer to [69]
and further in-depth information about Web Services and SOA can be found in [14].
We consider the EIC as a black box. It offers several Services out of which two
are of interest to us: the Connector Service and the Data Delivery Service.
The Connector is mapping incoming packets into a format the EIC can use. The
packet format is different for each type of source, e.g. Ptolemy II and the Cisco
1See http://www.sap.com/platform/netweaver/
2See https://www.sdn.sap.com/irj/sdn/nw-mainreleases
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Controller do not use the same data formatting, and consequently a new Connector
is needed for each type of source.
On the other hand, the Data Delivery Service is in charge of delivering sensor data
to Applications. The Data Delivery Service offers both the Pull and the Push Tech-
nology. Pulling Data means that the Application is the request originator and pulls
the data from the server. In contrast, the Push Technology, also called publish/sub-
scribe paradigm refers to Applications that subscribe to a type of information (e.g.
Temperature). When new data is available, the server pushes the information to
the requestor. A general overview of the EIC can be found in 2.2.1 and its complete
architecture is detailed in [42].
6.1.3 Access Control Module
The Access Control Module (or Access Control Point) is in charge of authentication
of users and the delivery Grants. The ACP Class Diagram is depicted in Figure 6.7.
ACP as a Web Service
The ACP is implemented as a Web Service and exposes a method called getGrant().
This method takes a Credential (e.g. a Role, a password or a X.509 Certificate [9])
as input, evaluates it and if the credential is valid, the ACP returns a Grant to the
User. The Grant that is returned to the User contains the cryptographic material
necessary to decrypt Sensor Data.
In Figure 6.8, we see a message flow of a Grant delivery to an Application. First,
a User (e.g. a Business Application) invokes the Web Service via the getGrant()
method and provides its credentials. Then, the ACP reads the Authorization Class
Tree and evaluates the provided credential. If the authentication is successful, the
ACP creates a Grant and sends it back to the User. The User now has all the
cryptographic material required to generate decryption keys.
Configuration of the AC Tree
As mentioned in the previous section, the ACP “reads the Authorization Class
Tree” to evaluate the requestor’s credentials. In our current implementation, the
credentials are roles (e.g. TemperatureManager). They re represented by a simple
character chain. In a future version of this implementation, the credential could be
X.509 certificates [9].
We developed a Configuration Tool that enables an Administrator to assign Roles to
Sensor Data Types. This configuration step is the initial step in the simulation that
defines which Data Types are accessible by which Roles. The configuration Interface
is depicted in Figure 6.6. The main features are a list of existing Data Type - Role
mappings and a visual representation of the tree. The Administrator can Add and
Delete associations with a single click. The tree view of the mappings considerably
eases the configuration process as it provides an appealing overview.
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When the configuration is completed, the tree is saved in an XML structure on
the file system. The ACP Service reads the saved tree on every Grant request. This
means that changes done to the Authorization Class Tree are taken into account by
the ACP without any latency.
Figure 6.6: Authorization Class Tree Configurator
6.1.4 Web Dynpro Businness Application
Web Dynpro is SAP’s standard UI technology for developing web-based applica-
tions. Web Dynpro is based on the flexible Model-View-Controller [52] architecture
that helps to implement a clear separation of user interfaces from backend services.
Further information about the Web Dynpro technology can be found in [8].
In the scope of this project we developed a web-based Web Dynpro Application
that consumes sensor data. We urge the reader to take a look at Appendix D to get
an idea of what this business application looks like and the features it offers.
Figure 6.9 provides the series of actions taken when a User requests Sensor Data
via the Web Dynpro interface. At first, the User provides his credentials to the
Application. Then the Application invokes the getGrant() method from the ACP
Service. After the Application acquires a proper Grant, it queries the EIC for the
sensor data. Using the Grant, the GW, the ID and the Seq number, the Application
computes the decryption key and decrypts the data. The User is now able to see
the Data he requested.
By default, a User is able to retrieve all data, but can decrypt only a subset based on
his credentials. If the credentials do not allow decryption of the values, ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗’s
are displayed. If, on the contrary, the User is authorized, then the data is decrypted
and displayed. This behavior is shown in Figure D.14.
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Figure 6.7: Access Control Module Class Diagram
Figure 6.8: Access Control Module Sequence Diagram
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Figure 6.9: Web Dynpro Application Sequence Diagram
6.1.5 Conclusion
In the previous sections we showed the details of the Java Simulation we developed.
This prototype enabled us to prove the feasibility of implementing the Access Control
Scheme. However, the drawback is that the WSN is simulated, and therefore we are
not able to analyze the scheme’s efficiency. Thus the next step was to implement
the scheme on real hardware.
6.2 Hardware Prototype
A simulation offers a nice environment for testing the functionality of a system before
dealing with actual hardware elements. Especially WSN integration into business
applications is not considered as an easy task if we compare the interest to use such
applications with the amount of working implementations. After our Java prototype
showed satisfactory results in terms of feasibility, we decided to create a prototype
using real sensor nodes. To that effect, we leveraged Cisco’s expertise in WSN
hardware and on node programming.
6.2.1 Updated Architecture
The first step in the collaboration is to update the architecture of the system. In
Figure 6.11 we see that a few components changed. In particular, the Ptolemy II
simulation environment is replaced by a WSN made of Crossbow MTS3103 Sensor
Boards and a Crossbow NB100 Stargate Netbridge Gateway. Also, the Access Con-
trol Module is now on a separate hardware entity called the Cisco Controller and is
3See http://www.xbow.com/
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Figure 6.10: Hardware Setup
not hosted on the same machine as the middleware anymore. In a real deployment
one would expect that the ACM is on a separate entity than the rest of the middle-
ware for security reasons. If one of the two devices is compromised, the other one
can still be functional.
Figure 6.10 shows the hardware setup that we use in our prototype. We iden-
tify different components such as the Crossbow MTS310 Sensor Nodes, a Sink, the
Crossbow NB100 Stargate Netbridge Gateway and a Cisco Controller that hosts the
ACM.
6.2.2 Code Porting
The second step was to rewrite the code for the encryption part on the sensor nodes.
In Ptolemy II, we use the Java language which cannot be put on Sensors due to their
technical limitations. We rewrote the key generation algorithm using NesC4, which
is the programming language for Crossbow Sensors.
The Access Control Module needed to be rewritten as the Cisco Controller does
not provide a Java Virtual Machine. It should be noted that Cisco did the migra-
tion of the ACM onto the Controller and that their expertise in sensor programming
4See http://nescc.sourceforge.net/
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Figure 6.11: Hardware Prototype Architecture
and configuration contributed greatly to the successful completion of this prototype.
6.2.3 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we provide some empirical performance indicators of the implemented
access control scheme. Due to time constraints, we are not able to provide precise
performance evaluation figures at this point. Instead, we will present a first estimate
based on our daily usage of the nodes.
There is a rough 33% overhead on the transmitted messages compared to those
without encryption. This overhead is explained by the size of the hash (160 bits)
and the additional parameters Seq, ID, GW, AC span that are sent along with the
encrypted value.
Also, we observed a 33% increase in battery consumption when using the encryption
scheme. The reasons for this are mainly (i) the longer transmission and reception
times due to the increased size of the messages and (ii) the additional computations
that are required to generate the keys. We note that the computational overhead
is minimal compared to the transceiver’s increased power consumption. Last but
not least, we did not perceive any noticeable latency in the flow of generated sensor
data.
6.2.4 Publication
The outcome of this collaboration is a publication [41] published in the MobiQuitous
2008 conference in Dublin. The paper presents the prototype that was developed
in collaboration with Cisco System France. It can be found as addendum to this
document.
6.3 Conclusion
In this chapter we showed the implementation details of the Java proof-of-concept
and the Hardware prototype that were developed during the course of this thesis.
In particular, we showed how the Java implementation lead to a collaboration with
Cisco Labs France to create a hardware prototype. We also provided some empirical
performance evaluation that forms a basis for more precise and thorough evaluations
for the future. These performance indicators will allow a comparison of the efficiency
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to other similar security schemes than the one we implemented.
During the implementation phase, we realized that the Enterprise Integration Com-
ponent is a modular and flexible WSN middleware. The only major change inside
of the EIC was the development of a new Connector Service. Since all components
of our architecture are based on the SOA paradigm and as such are independent
from each other, no other services of the EIC required additional modifications.
Furthermore, the web-based web dynpro application first developed for the Java
proof-of-concept was reusable since the application is completely independent of the
backend infrastructure.
We would like to stress that our work was validated through a publication [41]
at the Mobiquitous 2008 conference (see Section 6.2.4).
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
This Master Thesis dealt with the secure integration of WSNs into business appli-
cations. By analyzing the impact of BSNs and ASNs on healthcare systems, we
realized that the vision of ubiquitous remote patient monitoring raises many secu-
rity concerns. However, not knowing precisely what these security concerns were,
we were led to the formulation of the following question: “Why do we need security,
and what do we secure?”
To answer this question, we identified the inherent risks in a healthcare system
following the NIST Risk Assessment methodology. We found that data exposure
constitutes the highest risk. Up until now, patients went to their doctor for health
checkups and as such their medical data was less likely to be exposed and maintain-
ing their privacy was easy. However, with the integration of WSNs into healthcare
systems, end-to-end confidentiality became an obvious security requirement. This is
because for example the sensor data is exposed in clear in WSNs and can be sniffed
with a simple antenna (see section 3.4).
To fill this requirement, we proposed an existing security scheme [83] that offers
end-to-end confidentiality of sensor data based on symmetric encryption. Seeing as
the authors did not analyze the security of the scheme, another question rose: “How
secure is this scheme?”. We answered this question with the analysis of the scheme’s
security (by looking at outside and inside attacks). This analysis was followed by
an evaluation of the pseudo-randomness of the encryption key generator. Given the
hypotheses stated in the scheme’s paper, evaluating the randomness was a crucial
step to prove the scheme’s security. We showed satisfactory results for the scheme
through the Security Analysis and we also proved that the key streams generated
are pseudo-random.
At this point the concern of the feasibility of the scheme in practice was raised.
Indeed, quite often the transition from theory to real implementations is not possi-
ble. However, we validated it by implementing the scheme first in Java then on real
sensor nodes. Following empirical performance evaluations of this hardware proto-
type we were able to support the claim of the authors that their scheme is efficient
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and can be considered in real life applications.
This thesis allowed to get in touch with a vast number of different domains, rang-
ing from WSNs and middlewares to the requirements of business applications and in
particular healthcare systems. So far, all these domains did not overlap and research
was focused in the individual research fields. However, the integration of all these
domains into one system opens so many new applications that we believe it will
attract more interest in the future.
With this project we wanted to show the potential of the integration of WSNs and
in particular BSNs and ASNs with business applications. We saw that it is possible
and can be performed in a secure way. To conclude we believe that security will
be taken more and more seriously in the future as the world is moving towards the
total interconnection of the human and the Internet.
7.1 Future Work
Due to time constraints in this thesis, some research directions could not be ad-
dressed properly. We consider the following list of research problems as an interesting
starting point for future research based on this thesis.
Key Distribution Schemes for the security scheme in WSNs One of the hy-
potetheses in the scheme’s paper is that the cryptographic material distributed
by the Access Control Module to the sensor nodes uses an authenticated and
secure channel. Since this issue was not addressed by the authors, we sug-
gest to investigate key distribution schemes for WSNs such as TESLA [70]
and random key-distribution with [31] or without [23] threshold cryptography.
We believe that these schemes are efficient enough to be used with resource
constrained WSNs like the ones we use in this project.
Access Control Policies In the security scheme we proposed, the authors did not
cover which access control policies the Access Control Module should use.
Therefore, in the current implementation, the ACM uses an XML file that
holds the hierarchy roles and authorization classes. However, this proprietary
file format does not conform to any standards. It would be likeable to replace
this access control policy with one based on an open standard such as XACML
[62]. XACML offers the handling of security tokens such as SAML [60] or X.509
certficates [9]. Such security tokens will be useful to increase the security
particularly on the Grant distribution part.
Performance Evaluation A main concern with WSNs is that sensors are low-
power devices. Especially when dealing with cryptography, sensors are very
sensible, since some algorithms can be very resource demanding (such as the
emerging Elliptic Curve Cryptography).
Performance evaluation thus becomes an important criterion when evaluat-
ing the feasibility of using a particular security scheme in real life applications.
A first estimation of the scheme’s performance can be found in Section 6.2.3.
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However, more extensive testing should be done by looking at different param-
eters such as battery exhaustion, CPU usage, introduced delay and bandwidth
overhead. We believe that for example the optimization of the code on the
sensor nodes could lead to a slower battery exhaustion.
In a next step, the performance of the scheme in [83] could be compared to the
performance of other WSN hierarchical security schemes. This would allow to
precise how efficient the scheme really is compared to others.
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APPENDIX A
UNIFORMITY HISTOGRAMS
In this section, we present all the histograms for the tests we performed in Chapter
5.
(a) Frequency Test (b) Block Frequency Test
(c) Cumulative Sums Test (d) Runs Test
Figure A.1: Histograms
85
C. Trefois - MSc Thesis 08
(a) Longest Run of Ones Test (b) Rank Test
(c) Non-Periodic Template Matching Test (d) Overlapping Template Matching Test
(e) Universal Statistical Test (f) Approximate Entropy Test
Figure A.2: Histograms
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(a) Random Excursions (b) Random Excursions Variant Test
(c) Serial Test
Figure A.3: Histograms
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APPENDIX B
MOBIQUITOUS 2008 DEMO PAPER
Please find the published MobiQuitous 2008 Demo Paper [41] as addendum to this
document.
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APPENDIX C
ACCESS CONTROL PAPER
Please find the paper about the Access Control Scheme [83] as addendum to this
document.
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APPENDIX D
APPLICATION EXAMPLE
In this Appendix, we show how a Business Application looks like. This is the actual
prototype that was shown at the MobiQuitous 2008 Conference. The reader can
refer to [41] for further information. The paper is also available as addendum to this
document.
In the demo business application we use the hierarchy of roles depicted in Figure
D.1.
Figure D.1: Role Hierarchy
The mapping for each Authorization Class on the Sensor Nodes is shown in Figure
D.2. We can see that different authorization classes can be mapped on the same
sensor node.
As a first Step, we log in the web interface using the Administrator role (see Figure
D.3). Figure D.4 shows the user interface once we successfully logged in.
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Figure D.2: Authorization Class Mapping
Figure D.3: Logging in as Administrator
Figure D.4: General View of the User Interface
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Figure D.5: List of Available Sensor Data
Figure D.6: Historic Sensor Data as Table
The Administrator can now select a Sensor Data Type from the list as in Figure
D.5. Furthermore, he can select the Node on which the Data should come from.
Finally, after selecting the timespan for the historical data (e.g. from 2 minutes ago
until Now), the User clicks on the Get Historic button to receive the list of Sensor
Data meeting that selection criteria (as in Figure D.6). Alternatively, the User can
switch to a graphical representation of the Historic Data by clicking on the Switch
to Graphics button (see Figure D.7 for an example).
The second feature of the User Interface is the Latest Sensor Data Tab. After picking
the wanted parameters, the User receives the latest sensor data available by clicking
on the Get Sensor Data (the result is depicted in Figure D.8).
The third option in the User Interface is called Sensor Data Notification. This fea-
ture allows for periodic updating of a selected sensor data type. This means that
each XX seconds, the user interface is updated with the latest sensor data available.
This enables the User to monitor the evolution of the Sensor Data. An example
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Figure D.7: Historic Sensor Data as Graphic
Figure D.8: Latest Sensor Data
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Figure D.9: First Notification in Table View
of notification is provided in Figures D.9, D.10 (for a textual view) and in Figures
D.11, D.12 for a graphical representation.
In this part, we log in with the TemperatureManager role (See Figure D.13). This
role can only decrypt Temperature related Sensor Data. If the User tries to decrpyt
Sensor Data different than Temperature, the Interface notifies the User by displaying
stars (∗∗∗∗∗∗∗) to show that this User is not allowed to read the values (see Figure
D.14).
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Figure D.10: Notification 5 seconds later in Table View
Figure D.11: Notification in Graphical View
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Figure D.12: Notification 5 seconds later
Figure D.13: Logging in as TemperatureManager
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Figure D.14: Decryption of a different Data Type not possible
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